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The Asian Relations Conference: The Group Discussions.

Gerald Packer

The Asian Relations Conference, sponsored by the Indian Council of World Affairs met at New Delhi, March-April, 1947. The aim of the conference was modestly stated as being "to provide a cultural and intellectual revival and social progress in Asia," but its true inception lay in the initiative of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. Nehru elaborated his ideas in an address to the Bombay Branch of the Council of World Affairs as being the encouragement of closer relations between Asian countries and the development of a solidarity which might lead to a real inter-Asian policy, primarily to preserve the peace of Asia. He considered that a conference upon an expert level of an unofficial and non-political character could exchange ideas on common problems and study ways and means of promoting closer contacts. Delegations were to be unofficial, representative of all shades of opinion and extend to all states interested in Asian affairs.

Pursuant to this invitation, delegations from practically all Asian countries arrived at Delhi before, during and after the Conference. They were supplemented by observers from the Arab League, Australia, Great Britain, U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. and United Nations Organisation. Altogether thirty-one countries attended, including the following:—

Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bhutan, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, China, Egypt, Georgia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Korea, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Lebanon, Malaya, Nepal, Outer Mongolia, Palestine, Philippines, Siam, Tadzhikistan, Tibet, Turkmenistan, Turkey, Uzbekistan and Viet Nam.

The principal abstentions were Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Japan. The Japanese absence was involuntary, no invitation being issued because of General MacArthur's embargo on Japanese travel overseas; and a number, possibly the majority of the delegations, appeared to regret it.

The Conference was organised in two separate parts, namely the public sessions and the group discussions. The opening and closing plenary sessions were staged in a large enclosure in the Old Fort at Delhi. Heads of delegations sat upon an elevated dais whilst speeches

were broadcast to enormous crowds for a period of two to three hours. These sessions were interesting, widely publicised and not entirely devoid of importance in their mass appeal to Asian freedom movements. This paper is concerned, not with this aspect of the Conference, but with the Group discussions which attempted a more or less expert consideration of specialised problems.

Group Discussions.

The reports of Group discussions give, with certain reservations, the views of a fairly representative cross section of Asian informed opinion upon Asian problems. They are a rough guide to the direction in which policy would trend if the dominant nationalist minorities in South-East Asia, free from external pressures, were left to their own devices.

Group discussions were organised to examine seven major subjects—

- (i) Cultural Problems.
- (ii) Racial Problems and Migration.
- (iii) National Movements for Freedom.
- (iv) Transition from Colonial to National Economy.
- (v) Agricultural Reconstruction and Industrial Development.
- (vi) Labour and Social Services.
- (vii) Status of Women and Women's Movements.

Round Tables were constituted of members of each delegation, observers and conference guests. The proceedings were open to the press but not to the public. Discussion was summarised by highly qualified Rapporteurs, whose reports were reviewed in small plenary sessions open by invitation to the public.

The Rapporteurs' reports should be examined in the light of the particular conditions of the Conference. The majority of delegates were political leaders and officials concerned with domestic administration. It would be disingenuous to imagine that they opened their hearts when their observations were available for public scrutiny. The Islamic delegates, for example, maintained a prudent silence during the greater part of the proceedings whilst the members of the various Soviet Republics obviously marked time on the Moscow line. No time limit was placed upon speeches and the group discussions seldom maintained that expert level the sponsors of the Conference intended. The Rapporteurs remedied this position by occasional intervention in debate to ensure that the sense of the discussion was along the lines which it appeared to them desirable to include in their reports. Nevertheless, the plenary sessions adopted these reports with little modification, though it is fair to add that

the apparent unanimity of delegates was encouraged by the fact that they did not have occasion to commit themselves by vote upon the many propositions placed before them.

Rapporteurs' Reports.

The most important matters covered refer to National Movements for Freedom, Racial Problems, Economic Policy and Cultural Problems.

(i) *National Movements for Freedom.*

The discussion was political, uninhibited and strongly anti-European. The same emotional reaction permeated the majority of Group discussions and it is fair to observe that the term "Imperialist" was directed equally at American and European policy in Asia. There was also an undercurrent of anti-Russian feeling but any public expression of this sentiment was adroitly sidetracked by the Indian delegates. This general anti-foreign attitude seems likely to continue until the National Freedom Movements have secured effective power in all South-East Asian countries. Further, despite the restraint of responsible leaders, the pan-Asian sentiment expressed by many delegates was essentially a repudiation of the possible merits and unquestionable achievements of the Western world, of whose civilisation the Australasian people are members. Private expressions of goodwill and friendship towards Australia need to be viewed against this broader background. Indeed, until the people of South-East Asia have succeeded in synthesising their ancient social customs with modern technology and administrative practice, friendship, as distinct from mere goodwill, between the West and these countries will be difficult to achieve and to maintain.

(ii) *Racial Problems and Migration.*

Discussion in the Group disclosed a degree of racial exclusion and discriminatory administrative practices by Asians against Asians not generally appreciated elsewhere. That great hostility existed against Chinese and Indian national minorities in certain areas was not denied, and the group discussion developed a set of liberal principles to cover the entry, naturalisation and status of aliens. These principles freely concede the right of each Asian country to determine the composition and homogeneity of its population and the right to restrict and to control immigration. The administrative procedures suggested in respect of alien minorities are in line with the generous, though sometimes misrepresented, Australian practice in these matters. Whilst quotas for inter-Asian migration were suggested, the question of an external Asian migration policy was not mentioned in group discussion. Nevertheless, the data papers

to the Conference draw attention to the demographic trends in Asian populations and suggest that the Asian peoples are entitled, under the Atlantic Charter, to relief from their growing population pressures through complete freedom of migration to the less closely populated areas of East Africa, Australia and the Pacific Islands. No similar suggestion is made concerning the sparsely populated areas of Soviet Asia, and the moral is obvious.

(iii) *Economic Policy.*

Economic discussions seemed to show a marked divergence of interest between the developing Asian national states. They have been competitors in foreign markets and will be competitors for foreign capital, if the extensive proposals for agricultural reconstruction and industrial development are actively pursued. At the moment, United States alone is in a position to finance Asian reconstruction and the anti-Western and anti-capitalist sentiment expressed by many delegates obviously ran counter to their national interests. Indeed, sentiment is forcing the pace of transition from a colonial economy under conditions in which the requisite capital is not in sight. Parallel Asian action upon economic matters is likely to be difficult to arrange and anything in the nature of a regional economic bloc is out of the question, quite apart from the clearly expressed Soviet opposition to such a proposal. The broad Asian picture emerging from the economic discussions is one of great internal and social difficulty. It is complicated by a severe post-war inflation; a tendency to national self-sufficiency which is likely to aggravate social unrest and delay the process of recovery; and finally, dependence upon a measure of American financial aid with its inevitable repercussions upon any system of multilateral trade and upon British Commonwealth interests.

(iv) *Cultural Problems.*

Much store was placed upon the cultural aspects of the conference and a large number of data papers dealt with the aesthetic traditions of the East and the historical aspects of Asian cultural contacts. Many eloquent references were made to these Asian traditions, coupled, to the satisfaction of many delegates, with critical comments upon the West. Group discussion was limited to two practical suggestions: the development of an international auxiliary language to replace English and the formation of an Asian Institute with a strong central organisation to promote inter-Asian cultural studies. The first proposal received little support and the second was sidetracked by the establishment of an Asian Relations Organisation with no more than a nominal central executive. It is difficult to resist the impression that the elaborate compliments of dele-

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gates towards the ancient cultures and traditions of countries other than their own were the product of politeness rather than of deep conviction. There was no evidence of a regeneration of an Asian culture and, in historical perspective, no particular reason, to anticipate such a development at the present time.

It will be clear from these comments that the original objectives expressed by Pandit Nehru were scarcely achieved by the Asian Conference. The unity of the Asian peoples appeared to be limited to an almost unanimous anti-European sentiment, directed to the moral support of the freedom movements in those Asian countries not yet completely independent and to maintenance of Asian neutrality in any further world war. Their differences relate to economic matters and these differences are likely to increase in importance as the various national states attempt to maintain stability in the face of inflation and internal social revolution. In such conditions, there is little immediate prospect of economic and political stability in East Asia. Reconstruction and development will proceed slowly, if at all, within the capacities of a series of separate national states and the terrible distress of the Asian people seems destined to continue without notable relief.

[Owing to the importance of the Rapporteurs' reports for estimating hitherto ill-defined Asian attitudes towards Asian problems, the reports will be published in full as documentation in this and the next issue of this Journal. See pp. 55.]

The Return of the Puppets in South-East Asia.¹

Geoffrey Sawer

A curious feature of the contemporary East Asian scene is that a number of persons who led or played important parts in the various puppet governments established by the Japanese continue to play an important part in the affairs of their respective countries. In Europe, the principal puppets have committed suicide or been executed or been sentenced to civil death. In Asia, participation in the affairs of the Japanese puppet governments does not seem to be regarded by the local populations as any major stain on a man's character, nor do the victorious Powers seem to have taken any measures to ensure that punitive action be taken against former 'collaborators.'

It is necessary to notice at once an exception to this general proposition. The principal Chinese puppet was Wang Cing Wei, who died in a Tokio hospital in November, 1944. There can be little doubt that he anticipated execution by the Chinese National Government. After his death, no Chinese puppet was entrusted with the authority which he had enjoyed. His chief successor, Chen Kung Po, was sentenced to death by the Chinese Supreme Court in May, 1946, and presumably the sentence was carried out. Nevertheless, the general policy of the Chinese National Government towards persons who occupied positions in the two puppet administrations erected by the Japanese seems to have been a lenient one; it is known that in most cases the officials in question maintained contact with the Chinese Nationalists throughout the war and performed various services for the Allied cause; most of them also reinsured themselves with the National Government by facilitating the seizure of control by the Nationalists as against the Communists during the struggle for power which followed the Japanese surrender.

The principal Japanese puppet in Burma throughout the occupation was Ba Maw. He had himself appointed "adipadi," the nearest Burmese equivalent to "duce" or "fuehrer," and in other re-

1. The author thanks Mr. T. Hoey, Director of the Short Wave Division of the Department of Information, and Miss Mollie Brown, Archivist of the Division, for access to their listening post files, which are still the best source of information in Australia as to events in South East Asia during the war. The collation and interpretation of the material are entirely the author's responsibility.

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spects his broadcast and published statements during the Japanese occupation came closer than those of any other puppet leader to advocacy of the specific doctrines of Fascism. He also very actively advocated the cause of Japan, and attacked that of the Allied powers. In March, 1943, he visited Tokio, was feted by the Japanese militarists and entered his son at a Japanese school. In November, 1943, he represented Burma at a grand conference of puppet States held in Tokio. In September, 1945, when Lord Mountbatten was over-running Burma and the bulk of the Burmese puppet army under Aung San went over to the Allied side, Ba Maw fled to Japan. In January, 1946, he gave himself up to the occupation forces in Tokio. In August, 1946, he was sent back to Rangoon, where he was welcomed at a public banquet. So far as is known, no action has ever been taken against him in respect of his collaborationist activities. He now leads a small Burmese party pledged to the immediate expulsion of all British influence in Burma, and opposing the gradualist policy of the People's Anti-Fascist League, headed by his former follower and present Premier of Burma, Aung San. So far as is known, Ba Maw took no part in the long series of negotiations in 1944 and 1945 by which Aung San and the senior military leaders of the Burmese puppet army abandoned the Japanese side. Ba Maw is an astute politician and an exceptionally able platform orator. It is unlikely that we have heard the last of him.

Achmed Soekarno began to be quoted by the Japanese as supporting their side in June, 1942. In March, 1943, he was appointed President of a "people's movement for the reconstruction of Java under Nippon military administration." In November, 1943, he attended the conference of puppets in Tokio, as representative of the Indonesian "people's movements" organised by the Japanese, and was decorated by the Emperor. The Japanese never created an Indonesian republic. Their policy was to keep the Netherlands East Indies divided into four main administrative areas, and to discourage all genuine native political activity. They promised only increased participation by the indigenes in administration. Soekarno came to be the principal representative of the Javanese population in dealings with the Japanese, but he does not appear at any time to have occupied a formal administrative position in the Japanese governmental system. But he established contact with republican elements who had been suppressed by the Japanese in 1942, and is now the President of the autonomous Java-Sumatra state, which under the terms of recent agreements with the Dutch is to become a unit in the Indonesian federation under the Dutch Crown.

The principal Japanese puppet in the Philippines was Jose Laurel, who became president of the Philippines Republic set up by the

Japanese in 1943. It was stated in the press in 1945 that action was being taken against Laurel and his chief assistant, Gorge Vargas, but the proceedings were dropped. Laurel has since been reported as having made a public statement opposing the grant of economic privileges to the United States of America. Manuel Roxas, now President of the Philippines Republic created on July 4th, 1946, was one of the group of supporters of the late President Quezon who remained in the Philippines in 1942 at the express request of Quezon and MacArthur. In June, 1942, Roxas was appointed by the Japanese to the Philippines Independence Preparatory Committee. This Committee drafted the puppet Constitution. In April, 1944, Roxas was appointed to the Economic Planning Board set up by the puppet government, and in August of that year he was appointed a Minister without Portfolio in the puppet government, so as to integrate cabinet decisions with those of the Planning Board. This board was regarded by the Japanese and by the puppet government as of major importance to the Japanese war effort, but it is impossible to say how far it exercised an independent discretion and how far it carried out the instructions of the Japanese military and naval commanders.

In Siam, the principal Japanese puppet was Pibul Songram, who was Premier at the time of the Japanese occupation and continued in that position until July, 1944. Throughout that period he was also Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, and at various times held the additional portfolios of defence and foreign affairs. Pibul made numerous broadcasts and published statements congratulating the Japanese on their victories, attacking the Allied cause and urging the Siamese that their best interests lay in a Japanese victory. Pibul, like Ba Maw, tended to ape the style and policies of the Italian Fascists. He carried out publicity campaigns with the slogan "Pibul is right," and endeavoured to whip up anti-Chinese sentiment for the same purposes as the European Fascists used anti-Semitism. In November, 1943, Pibul refused to attend the puppet conference in Tokio because the Japanese would not accede to his demand that Siam be given senior status amongst the puppets. He sent his best wishes. In October, 1945, Pibul was arrested and indicted as a war criminal under an ex post facto statute then passed by the Siamese National Assembly. In March, 1946, the Siamese Supreme Court held that the Constitution prohibited ex post facto criminal laws and quashed the indictments. Pibul now occupies no official position but remains an influential personage behind the scenes in Siam. In March this year, he organised a new "Conservative Party," which will contest the next general election to the Assembly; Pibul himself has announced that he

intends to stand for the Senate. Seven Bangkok newspapers are supporting him, and there is evidence that he has considerable influence in the armed forces and the police. His former police chief, Luang Adul, is now Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and four members of the present Cabinet were members of Pibul's puppet administration. Not only are these former puppets regaining political power in Siam; there is also evidence that they are elbowing out Siamese who gave faithful service to the Allies, such as Seni Pramoj and Luang Sarabhaya.

The two principal Indian collaborators were Subhas Chandra Bose and Ras Behari Bose—(they were not related to each other)—who died or were killed in unexplained circumstances during the last stages of the war. British military authorities claimed in 1946 to have discovered the remains of Subhas Chandra Bose at the scene of an aeroplane crash in French Indo-China, but a legend survives in India that he is still alive. It is clear from the British abandonment of the attempt to prosecute other leading members of the "Indian National Army," which fought with the Japanese, that Indian public opinion would have been very much on the side of the two Boses if they had survived. No individual Indian, Malay or Chinese in the Malayan Peninsula acquired any war-time prominence as a Japanese collaborator.

It may seem surprising and even shocking to large numbers of Australians that men who worked along with the Japanese should now be not only at liberty but in most cases in positions of importance in the communities of South-East Asia. Doubtless, too, the men in question might have improved the influence and prestige of freedom movements to which they belong if they had voluntarily abdicated any position of authority. However, Australians have to accept the position as it is, and might be assisted towards a workable policy for the future if they could obtain a detailed explanation of this apparently puzzling phenomenon. The writer would not presume to explain it in detail; the materials for the explanation can probably be obtained only on the spot. The following suggestions however, may be made on the basis of information available here—

(a) Every one of the men mentioned above consistently stated as his primary objective the immediate independence of his people from European exploitation, and constantly stressed the Japanese promises of eventual independence or autonomy within "Greater East Asia." These protestations seem to have been accepted at face value by a majority of the indigenous populations.

(b) It was a matter of brutal fact that none of the countries

concerned were capable of resisting the Japanese, and the white Powers were equally unable to do so at the time. Given the inevitability of Japanese occupation, someone had to act as liaison between the conquered peoples and the conqueror. In the course of this liaison, it was inevitable that any local leader who desired to protect his people (and himself) as far as possible from Japanese atrocities had to go some distance in the direction of collaboration. It is therefore a question of degree as to whether in particular instances the limits of "permissible" collaboration were over-stepped. The indigenous populations are likely to take a more charitable view of what happened than is the average Australian.

(c) The memory of Japanese atrocities and administrative incompetence is already fading throughout South-East Asia. In many cases, the present chaos makes former Japanese control seem orderly and efficient by comparison. The recent Pan-Asian conference at New Delhi suggested that the Japanese are coming to be remembered chiefly as the Eastern race which sought to expel and in a degree succeeded in expelling European influence, and which created the conditions for the present rapid development of East Asian autonomy. Hence collaboration with the Japanese is unlikely to be regarded in the same way as past collaboration with German and Italian Fascism is regarded in Europe.

(d) Even persons distrusted in South East Asia because of "excessive" collaboration may be tolerated if they possess technical or administrative abilities not commonly possessed in those regions. This is especially so in Indonesia, where the Japanese as a matter of deliberate policy killed all the trained native administrators whom they could catch and whom they suspected of favouring either the Allied cause, or the creation of an independent Indonesian republic.

The United Nations Charter Critically Considered:

Veto, Assembly, Secretariat and Enforcement Provisions.

Sir Frederic Eggleston

I have already examined the general scheme of the Charter and dwelt particularly on the place of the Security Council within it.¹ I pointed out that the crucial clause of the Charter, Article 39, was ambiguous but that the current interpretation was to give the Council power to formulate the terms of settlement of disputes and enforce them by sanctions. This power was examined, its enormous scope was pointed out and the character of the veto, which would in most cases be invoked, indicated. It was then suggested that this illogical and disruptive device might have been avoided if the powers of the Council to impose sanctions were restricted to rebutting the exercise of force as an instrument of policy by any nation. The covenant not to use force was basic to the Charter. The use of sanctions to enforce a settlement of political disputes was held to be impossible of acceptance, at any rate on the mere fiat of the Council.

The Veto.

There is not very much more to say about the veto except to point out its all-pervading and disruptive character. But, before I do this, I should meet the point that is made that the existence of a veto is the condition of the entrance of both the U.S.A. and Russia into the United Nations; it must at present therefore be accepted. It was indeed originally proposed by all the sponsoring Powers, but I do not think that either China or Great Britain would have insisted on it if the others had been willing to concede it.

The main fact in the last paragraph is correct. The U.S.A. and Russia insisted on the veto and are still determined to maintain it. This does not make it more acceptable and should not prevent anyone from pointing out that the use of it may prevent the organi-

1. *Austral-Asiatic Bulletin*, October, 1946, p. 17.

sation from working and cause a breakdown far more serious than that of the League. When a member of the British Delegation said to me, "If you people knock out the veto, there will be no world organisation," I replied, "If the veto is in, will there be any world organisation?" The answer to my question is that, if it is fully exercised, the Organisation will be completely ineffective as an instrument for avoiding war, though it may be a useful world forum.

The great danger is that everybody will lose faith in the organisation. I think, however, that it is worth while persisting because the views of each country may change. The Baruch proposals on the atomic bomb suggest action against an infringement of the agreement without benefit of veto. Russia clings to it because she believes her claims and ideologies are unpopular and that the rest of the world will "gang up" on her. But she has believed this for years. She believed it in the early stages of the League and then joined it. She now resents her expulsion from the League on account of the attack on Finland, a war which certainly would conflict with undertakings like those of the Charter. That mood will also presumably pass. We should, therefore, proceed with the organisation and criticise these provisions which are obnoxious to our principles, show up their unconstitutional and disruptive character all the time.

The so-called veto arises out of the provisions of Article 27 (2) and (3), which provide that in procedural matters decisions shall be made by a vote of seven members; on all other matters by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring vote of the permanent members. The word "procedural" is not defined, but it has generally been agreed that it deals only with votes of adjournment and possibly fixing a day of meeting—it would not cover the nomination of a new member. The drafting is very bad. In any properly-drafted document establishing a committee and providing for the voting, the words "present and voting" would be inserted. This drafting enables a permanent member to defeat a motion by absence or abstention.

It seems to be believed that these voting provisions are a compromise but this is only partly true. There is no doubt, I think, that all the Great Powers proposed independently that the concurring vote of the great Powers was necessary for a decision. There was, however, a dispute at Dumbarton Oaks as to whether a great Power should vote in a dispute in which it was a party. It is understood that Russia was obdurate on the point and no settlement was made at Washington. Subsequently, President Roosevelt is credited with having proposed at the Conference and at Yalta the proviso at the end of Article 27 (3): "provided that in decisions under

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Chapter VI and under paragraph 3 of Article 52 a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting." This was carried.

It is characteristic of the poverty of the criticism of the terms of the Charter that this decision was hailed unto a sigh of relief. The fact, however, is that the scope of the power of "decision" under Chapter VI of Article 52 is relatively unimportant. I have already examined Chapter VI and it is difficult to find in it any power to make a decision in a major issue. The only power given is to make "recommendations" which are not binding on the parties. The only positive decision that seems to be contemplated is the reference of the dispute to the World Court if it is justiciable in character. It is doubtful whether the Council could insist on this. The teeth of the Charter appear in Article 39 with the succeeding enforcement provisions and here a Power can veto any decision in a dispute in which it is a party.

As it stands, the veto can be used as a mere instrument of obstruction. This disruptive character of the veto should be clear when it is realised that it applies all through the various activities of the United Nations and even in cases where a member cannot vote in its own case another great Power can veto for it and, in case it is not interested directly, one Power can prevent a case from being considered in which a friendly Power is involved. One great Power can veto the admission of new members (Article 4), the suspension and restoration of members (Article 5), the expulsion of a member (Article 6), presentation of an annual report or special report (Article 15), establishment of commissions, etc. (Article 29), permission of a non-member to participate in discussions of the Council (Article 31), invitation to a party to attend (Article 32), decisions as to sanctions (under Articles 39, 41 and 42), and to interim measures (Article 40), invitation of non-members (Article 44), establishment of Military Staff Committee (Article 47), action of Staff Committee (Article 47 (3) and (4)), direction to member states (Article 48 (1)), financial assistance (Article 50), and authorisation of action under regional arrangement (Article 53).

The Council is mercifully kept off the ground occupied by the Social and Economic Council which seems to support the view here taken that the veto was insisted on by those who feared that the powers of the Security Council were too large. The cloven hoof of the veto, however, reappears in the chapter re Trusteeship. In the Trusteeship Council, a majority "present and voting" can make decisions, but, where, in pursuance of Article 83, the Security Council exercises the functions of United Nations in relation to strategic areas, the veto can be used.

This is a formidable test and it undoubtedly gives the opportunity to a disaffected great Power to wreck the organisation entirely or to extract great advantages from it by a threat to exercise the veto. The fact is that the organisation contemplated at Moscow, Washington and Yalta is only feasible if the great Powers are unanimous. It is unworkable if they are suspicious of one another. Those statesmen and public servants at these conferences and publicists like Lippman who believed that they could remain unanimous were simple. There was nothing in world history or in the previous relations of the parties to justify such a view.

It is, of course, true that it is not always easy to say whether force has been threatened or is being used and a decision must be made on this point. I would agree that a special majority, eight out of eleven, say, with a certain proportion of great Powers, should be required. In this case, the alleged delinquent might be able to manoeuvre enough support to prevent action; action would only be possible in clear cases. But to give one Power (and that a great Power) power simply to block action when opinion as to its aggression is otherwise unanimous against it is simply fatal. The scheme is at once too weak, too strong and too simple. It is weak because it can be easily defeated; it is too strong because the powers are too wide, and it is too simple because only one device, a crude veto, is used for a complicated problem.

The Assembly.

This points to the other part of this paper—the consideration of the position of the Assembly. I have spoken of the veto as being regarded as a check, but an illogical one, to the extraordinary powers of the Council. Why should not the Assembly be regarded as a more appropriate check? If a threat to use force or an actual use of force were made and action decided on by the Security Council or refused by it, why should not the General Assembly be resorted to for a general opinion to be given by an 80 or 85 per cent. vote?

We have seen also that there may, on analysis, be found a certain type of international dispute in which some decision is necessary and can be made in clear-cut terms, e.g., the right to use an international waterway. Such cases are unsuitable for simple decision by the Security Council and should be referred to the International Court, but, at some stage, a decision of a political character may be necessary. In this case, Article 40 should be invoked, the situation frozen and the Assembly called.

Those responsible for the Charter have weakened the authority of the United Nations in two ways. Firstly, by the veto which de-

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privates the Council of moral authority, and, secondly, by refusing all positive power to the General Assembly. It has been said by publicists like J. F. Dulles that the moral authority of the United Nations will centre in the Assembly because of the lack of power. I fear, however, that this is wrong. Men have no respect for advisory organs, for political bodies without power.

I will never forget the nonsensical reasons given at San Francisco as a rationalisation of the proposed draft. "The Council must be given full responsibility for security." One American member expressed his approval in principle of an amendment purporting to enlarge the power of the Assembly but regretted that he could not accept it "because of security." But why should a power in the Assembly imperil the responsibility of the Council? The powers of Parliament do not imperil the responsibilities of the Cabinet. On the contrary, Parliament exacts responsibility from Ministers and sees that it is discharged.

So far did the depreciation of the Assembly go that Article 12 was never deleted in spite of many attacks. This forbids the Assembly from making any recommendations with regard to a dispute or situation while the Security Council is dealing with such dispute. In other words, when a dispute of world-wide significance is being dealt with, the nations who are to be asked to provide the economic and other sanctions are not to have any say. I do not think that those who sponsored the Draft support this, except Russia. It was nonsensical because, although the Assembly is forbidden to make recommendations, it cannot be prevented from discussing a problem or from passing resolutions which do not recommend action. In fact, nobody can prevent a deliberative body from discussing anything. If it is prevented by Cromwellian methods, it can meet outside on the tennis court. A United States Senator, who dearly wished to call the Assembly "the town meeting of the world," introduced Article 14, but to get it through he had to make it subject to Article 12. Imagine a town meeting at Providence (Rhode Island) during a diphtheria epidemic being told that they could not discuss it because Roger Williams was thinking about it.

There was a tremendous struggle to widen Clause 11 which defined the scope of the Assembly's powers. This attempt was sponsored very largely by Australia and Belgium, and resisted mainly by Russia. It should be noted that this was not a proposal to give the Assembly power to act but only to discuss—to extend the list of subjects which it could discuss. It was clear that an attempt would be made to restrict the Assembly's power to debate about peace and

security and armaments. The result was that the Assembly's powers of debate were on the whole affirmed and Article 10 was inserted as a last-moment compromise. This gave the Assembly power to discuss anything within the scope of the Charter. I reiterate that it is really impossible to prevent a deliberative Assembly from discussing anything it chooses to discuss. But there is no doubt that attempts will be made to get the President to rule discussions out of order if they range wide or criticise the conduct of the Council.

The position of the Assembly is further weakened because it has no permanent official head nor any officials definitely attached to it. The President of the Assembly is elected for the session only (Article 21) and goes out of office immediately the session ends. There is, therefore, no person charged with the responsibility of watching its interests and initiating the process provided for in Article 20 for calling emergency sessions. An Australian amendment to appoint the President for a year or until a successor was elected was not understood and was rejected. The Assembly is given sole control over the Budget and could, theoretically, exert pressure by refusing supply, but this would defeat the organisation entirely.

The Charter was indeed drafted with great scruple to deprive the Assembly of real power. In the election of Secretary, general admission and suspension of members, it can only vote on the recommendation of the Security Council. It was somewhat depressing to see representatives of the great Anglo-Saxon democracies supporting this attempt to restrict the power of the Assembly. Their excuse was that Russia would not come in unless the plan was adopted. But it would have been better if they had allowed Russia to argue her own case. The Russians might then have understood how unreasonable it was. When they found Anglo-Saxons rationalising it, they must have considered it quite respectable.

The Secretariat.

A word must be said here about the Secretariat. The clauses, as they were finally adopted, were drawn with much care so as to make the Secretariat truly international in character. But the character of the staff will depend on circumstances operating on the Secretary General. The Assembly having practically no powers, the Secretary General is undoubtedly responsible to the Council and under its directions. During the debate, the great Powers sponsored an amendment which provided for the independent election of four Assistant or Deputy Secretaries General who would then have been free of any tie to the Secretary General. This was actually sup-

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ported in Committee by British delegates, but withdrawn after the strong opposition of smaller Powers.

The Enforcement Scheme.

This scheme, which is contained in Chapter VII from Article 40 to Article 51, is the most critical part of the Charter, but the least discussed. I feel that it is an excellent scheme if properly carried out, but, as it depends on a series of voluntary agreements as to armaments, it will be very difficult to conclude. If the agreements are not made, this part of the Charter falls to the ground and any power in the United Nations to prevent war disappears.

The scheme gives to the Council the power to decide on sanctions, whether economic (Article 41) or military (Article 42), and in the meantime call upon the parties to maintain the status quo (Article 40). The members have bound themselves to carry out these directions. If these Articles had remained without anything further, the position would have been the same as under the League. Under the Covenant, no plan of operations was contemplated for carrying out sanctions. If it was decided to apply them under the Covenant, the Council would then have to improvise a plan of operations and it would, of course, be at a hopeless disadvantage as against a determined aggressor who would have prepared beforehand. In this respect, the Charter is satisfactory as supplying a fatal lack in the Covenant.

The organisation of force is thus specifically provided for in a form carefully defined in Articles 43 and 45. The former provides that the assistance to be given by states is to be set out in agreements entered into by them on the initiative of and with the Security Council. These agreements are to set out the number and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided. By Article 45, members are to hold available air force contingents for combined international air action and the amounts contributed for this purpose are to be set out in the agreements.

In the Dumbarton Oaks draft, there was a great deal of confused thought about these agreements; they were to be "concluded among themselves" and then approved by the Security Council. It is made clear in the Charter that the agreements are to be "negotiated by the members on the initiative of the Security Council" (Article 43). As it is subsequently provided by Article 46 that plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee, it seems obvious that these agreements should be on the lines of the Staff Committee's

plan. A general security plan was freely talked about at San Francisco. This talk was presumably based on Articles 46 and 47 which call on the Military Staff Committee to assist the Security Council in making plans for the application of armed force and also on questions relating to "military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulations of armaments and possible disarmament."

If such a scheme could be worked out, it would be a great achievement and give what is wanted to achieve security. But it is not going to be obtained easily and it is necessary to imagine what will be the state of mind of the representatives of the various members as they approach the negotiation of these agreements. Whether the Staff Committee will work out a plan first and then intimate what the states are expected to provide or whether the members are to give offers of assistance is not clear. Any direction by the Council might very well be resented. It seems clear, however, that, whether in making the offers or in fixing the amounts, the states must have regard to the relative forces offered or fixed for neighbouring powers. A state will want to have enough to defend itself from attack, but not want the expense of a large surplus. If the Security Council inspires respect and confidence, offensive action by smaller states would be impossible or highly improbable. Thus, it is impossible to envisage agreements of this kind signed by all members of the United Nations unless they are prepared along a co-ordinated plan in which relative strengths and possible aggregated strengths are carefully weighed. If such a series of agreements were negotiated, they would amount to a regulation of armaments.

From this, it would be easy to go a step further and provide for a proportionate reduction of armaments. For, if the forces of a number of states are regulated in a relative plan so that none has a surplus for attack and therefore all are safe, they will be equally safe if these numbers are proportionately reduced. Thus, as forces are reduced, the national air forces collected under Article 45 could be made truly international. They should never be sufficient to become overwhelming. They should become an international police force occupying, according to a military plan, those bases from which aggressive action could be stayed. If these conceptions prevailed, each state should be compelled to keep available the forces it had promised. It would be its duty to defend itself against aggression but never to exceed the quota as fixed in the plan. To enforce these obligations, a system of inspection would be necessary.

I have developed what I consider to be the logical conclusions to

be derived from the Articles of the Charter; the difficulties of the first arrangement and maintaining of it are, however, formidable. The arrangement of the quotas for the various states would present as many difficulties as were presented at the Disarmament Conferences. It is exceedingly unlikely that soldiers, sailors, and airmen would look at a security plan in a detached way as security from aggression generally. Soldiers, in preparing plans, envisage them as against someone—either attack or defence—and their attitude to a general security plan would be one of bewilderment. But it is, I contend, possible to prepare a plan which will give general equilibrium on a strategic basis; certain danger points would have to be secured and a minimum organisation for defence would have to be in existence in each state. The mobility of the air forces, especially with carriers, makes this possible.

There is, however, a substantial difficulty in the vast difference between the great Powers and the smaller Powers. The polarisation of force has gone too far and, unless the great nations are willing to sacrifice sovereignty to a greater extent than they have shown to date, it will be difficult to do anything.

Another difficulty which is inherent in these matters is due to the fact that military efficiency is not due only to arms and military power but to courage, readiness and desire to maintain national integrity. China, with its population of 450 million, could have easily repelled the forces of 80 million Japanese, if she had been prepared to do so. This state of disorganisation which allowed the Japanese in was nobody's fault but her own.

In this analysis, I have given no special consideration to the implications of atomic warfare in the Security system. It will obviously have important results in any plans that have been made and these plans will probably be considered by soldiers who hate to admit the force of this new weapon and that it has produced any changes in their conceptions of strategy and tactics. These changes are obvious to everybody else but the public will not be represented on the Military Staff Committee.

The impact of the atomic bomb on warfare is indeed so great that it must have separate treatment. There are, however, several important truths to be borne in mind. First, that the best defence against the bomb resides in the power of retaliation against the aggressor—retaliation which will mean widespread devastation to him. This may be an effectual deterrent, and the bomb may never be used. If this is so, and the special arrangements now being discussed are accepted, war may go on in the conventional way, so that it is still necessary to consider the scheme in the Charter.

This enforcement section of the Charter gives very good ground for hope because it provides an opportunity, of which we must endeavour to take advantage, of creating a stable security scheme which would make aggression exceedingly difficult.

One difficulty of international organisations is that we are too apt to think that the acceptance of a Charter concludes the matter. When the draft is accepted and the Charter signed, it is not easy to implement it or develop its possibilities. This was so in the Covenant of the League. The clauses as to disarmament and modification of economic restrictions remained unimplemented. It is true that they were in a negative form whereas something positive is necessary. Here we have a positive scheme in which the lacks of the Covenant are supplied and it is a challenge to world leadership to push on with the installations required and give the amount of reasonable accommodation which will be required to get the agreements. The duty owed in this respect by the great nations is paramount.

If once the progress to the control of armaments on a basis of an equilibrium of forces is started it will, I think, gather momentum—the idea of a strategic equilibrium of force which makes aggression unlikely or impossible may not appeal to the orthodox soldier who believes that attack is the only form of warfare worth considering. But I believe that, if the military mind would devote thought and military knowledge and the geographical information available could be supplied, such plans could be prepared. After all, the superiority of the attack is only evident on the tactical plane; on the strategical plane the defence has won time after time.

Here we must rely on a combination of factors. First, there will be the covenant not to use force; second, there must be the determination expressed as a principle of the Charter that any infraction of this principle will immediately be followed by sanctions. Thirdly, there will be a series of agreements by which the nations agree to provide specified forces to assist the Security Council to resist attack. These forces will be sufficient for defence, not sufficient to attack one's neighbours but sufficient in association with others to inflict sanctions on an aggressor. Fourth, there will be an international plan covering bases at strategic points so placed that movements of aggression can be resisted, and, lastly, a Staff Committee which can make the plans and direct the operations. In such a comprehensive scheme, there can be no place for the veto at any stage.

Regional Arrangements.

There is only one other phase of this part of the Charter which needs comment here and that is the provision for regional arrange-

ments. I believe we require these because I believe in decentralisation. If one brings all power into one focus, one relies on a calculus which is all-embracing and too wide. It obscures local interests and prevents us from dealing with problems which arise in local circumstances. In a world organisation, all great issues depend on the wills or the votes of all members. Decisions are made by members who have their own local interests in mind. Thus a question in the Pacific would depend on the votes of West European and Scandinavian powers whose interests in that area are small, but whose attitude would be determined by questions affecting their neighbours. We need to segregate the various groups of problems which depend on local causes so that decisions are made by those who have an interest in the area and desire to maintain stability there.

There are, however, dangers in regionalism. One danger is that the Powers grouped on a regional basis may use regionalism as an escape from world responsibility and try to erect closed regional systems. It is, therefore, essential that central control should not be abandoned. Action within a region should be subject to the consent of the Security Council but the Security Council should merely be concerned to preserve the integrity of the whole system and give large Powers to the regional authority.

Again, the regional authority should be carefully organised and be equipped with the machinery for decisions and security. The members of the regional organisation should be willing to make the same sacrifice to preserve world peace.

Chapter VIII of the Charter on regional arrangements is somewhat sketchy and it was difficult to resist the efforts of the South American members to erect a closed system.

The Hukbalahap in the Philippines.

T. Inglis Moore

Conflicts in the various countries of South-east Asia have indicated that this region of the Western Pacific, including the Philippines, is undergoing developments that may well have important repercussions for Australia. Of the countries concerned the Philippines occupies a special position as one of our near neighbours. It is also the first of the Pacific colonial dependencies to achieve its autonomy. It contains, moreover, the only Christian people in the East, and the most highly Westernized of all Eastern peoples. Filipino leaders, in fact, have expressed the hope that the new Republic may function as a liaison nation between East and West. At the same time the forces at work in such a Philippine movement as the Hukbalahap, the radical peasant movement, offer valuable examples of political and economic forces common to the Western Pacific, although their expression takes on local variations. These forces are notably complex in character, and I want to offer here an analysis of their constituent elements as revealed in the various roles which the Hukbalahap has played in the Philippines.

Thus the movement illustrates, to begin with, the effects of the Japanese occupation in promoting a native resistance movement which stimulated, in turn, independent action by a section of the community traditionally inured to acquiescence before authority. The occupation put arms into the hands of the people, and so endowed them with a power not known before in the past, when the bolos of revolting peasants had been quickly overcome by government bullets. This power, as in Indonesia, was misused for terrorism by certain lawless sections. It created, furthermore, new political patterns in the Philippines, just as it did in Indonesia, Burma, and French Indo-China. Resistance to the Japanese was followed in the latter countries by resistance to the metropolitan power, in the Philippines by defiance of a collaborators' government. Armed power and war organization also enabled the exploited peasants of Central Luzon to manifest an old agrarian discontent in a new and more effective manner. Collaborator landlords were liquidated with a patriotic flourish. Their lands were seized by landless tenants with

a blowing of Marxian trumpets by Socialist and Communist leaders. Semi-feudal peasants, one step removed from serfdom, found themselves electing provincial governments and engaged in local administration in a region traditionally dominated by the landlord who was often the cacique, or "local boss," as well. From the war-organized peasants of the Hukbalahap, hitherto politically inarticulate, came a militant and radical political opposition in a land where the ruling oligarchy had never encountered more than personal factions within its own group of *illustrados*. Economic, political, and nationalist factors combined to create a Left-Right alignment, thus introducing a familiar Western design into Philippine politics, just as the techniques of agrarian reform and local rule were innovations influenced by the Yenan regime in China.

It is natural, therefore, that the variety of roles played by the Huk, as it is popularly called, should have been confusing as well as complex. The confusion is shown by the violent controversies aroused by the Huks, both in America and the Philippines. Even in Australia a leading newspaper has carried articles on the Huks which have reflected widely divergent views.¹ Thus a former naval liaison officer on General MacArthur's staff in the Philippines expressed the official American Army opinion when he likened the Huks to "avowedly Communists," "roving bands of brigands" terrorising the countryside. On the other hand, two other articles written by the newspaper's own staff correspondents show a fuller and fairer understanding, picturing the Huks as fine fighters against the Japanese, exploited peasants with genuine grievances, and a mixture of "dissatisfied peasant farmers, ex-guerillas, and intellectuals." The general tendency has been either to stigmatise the Huks as Communists and cut-throats or to eulogise them as gallant patriots and militant democrats who are the hope of a progressive Philippines. Actually, of course, the Huks have included brave guerillas, ruthless bandits, Socialists and Communists, and, above all, the landless Filipino peasants using the war to carry out agrarian reforms.

The original role of the Huk was that of a popular resistance movement. As early as December 1941, within a few weeks of the first Japanese attacks, left-wing groups in Manila formed a United Front to resist the invader. In March 1942, it established as its military arm the Hukbalahap, an abbreviation of the Tagalog "Hukbong Bayan Laban Sa Hapones," or "People's Anti-Japanese Army."

1. *Sydney Morning Herald*:

Antony Whitlock, "Freedom in the Philippines may mean Trouble," 23 April, 1946.
Asher A. Joel, "Hukbalahap Dangerous Force in the Philippines," 22 May, 1946.
Jack Percival, "A Background to the Latest Civil War," 13 September, 1946.

Its aims were expulsion of the invader, co-operation with the United Nations to win the war, Philippine independence, a democratic government which would guarantee a minimum living wage, and extermination of traitors and collaborators. It became the main fighting resistance group, since the USAFFE (U.S. Forces in the Far East) guerillas mostly operated in small groups and concentrated on intelligence services. About 150,000 strong, well armed with weapons salvaged from Bataan or captured from the enemy, the Huks became so effective that the Japanese made a punitive drive into Central Luzon in 1943 to destroy them, but failed to break their resistance. It was not a national resistance movement, similar to those in the occupied countries of Europe, but a distinctively regional force confined to "the rice-bowl" of Central Luzon, and operating chiefly in the provinces of Pampanga, Tarlac, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan, and Laguna. It also possessed a squadron of Philippine Chinese Communists (Wak Chi), one of whom took charge of the Huk's school for military training. Its method of integrating itself with the local peasantry in guerilla areas was on Yenan lines, and this was one factor in its successful resistance to the Japanese punitive drive. It incorporated also a number of other guerilla groups, such as the Bulacan Military Area Guerillas, and such bodies as the National Peasants Union. Its leadership was drawn, not from the rank and file of the peasants, but from experienced leaders of trade unions, Socialist and Communist parties, and left-wing intellectual groups.

There is no doubt that the Huks possessed an excellent record of opposition to the Japanese as a resistance army. They claimed themselves that their squadrons had killed over 31,000 of the enemy—including 5,000 puppet police, spies and Quislings. The *Christian Science Monitor* reported that "by conservative estimates the Huks accounted for 20,000 Japanese and puppets killed in more than 1,100 encounters with the enemy." Colonel Thorpe, a representative of General MacArthur, congratulated the Huk in 1942 on its enemy effort. General Kreuger used the Huks to fight beside his U.S. Sixth Army after the reoccupation landing at Lingayen, and his chief of staff stated in a communique that "The Huk is one of the best fighting units I have known." Even their critics conceded the fighting quality of the Huks. Upon the American invasion they conducted an offensive of their own, and liberated a number of towns. They also offered their co-operation to the U.S. Army, and 1,000 men were accepted for use as labour battalions.

On the other hand, the American Army officially refused to accept the Huks as legitimate allies, forcibly disbanded many of

them, and put a number of the leaders in prison. Four factors appear to have operated to produce this attitude. The first was the later terroristic activities of some Huk squadrons. During 1944 the Huk leaders lost control over many units, who became bandits enforcing a reign of terror on innocent Filipinos as well as on collaborators. Responsible Filipinos have estimated that the Huks executed some 20,000 fellow countrymen, of whom many were traitors or collaborators, but many also were "liquidated" landlords, victims of personal grudges, USAFFE guerillas, or merely citizens who resisted demands for food. The line between "guerillas" and "bandits" often grew hazy, as in occupied Europe. The second factor was the opposition that developed in some areas between the Huks and USAFFE guerillas, which naturally prejudiced the American Army authorities against the former. The third was the agrarian reforms carried out against the landlords by the Huks, since the peasant forces took over estates abandoned by landlords who fled to Manila and collaborated with the Japanese. This revolutionary measure was naturally condemned by such influential advisers of General MacArthur as Colonel Soriano of his staff, a powerful Spanish industrialist and large landowner who was General Franco's official representative in the Philippines. Spanish-Filipino landed interests were also represented by Manuel Roxas, now President, also placed on MacArthur's staff. Thus the American Army was used, deliberately or otherwise, to suppress revolting peasants for the benefit of landowning interests. Finally, the fourth and perhaps most important factor in bringing about the suppression of the Huk was the radical character of its political activities, which led the American Counter-Intelligence Corps to condemn the movement as a Communist one that had to be stamped out without more ado.

Thus political sentiments obscured the fundamental fact that the Hukbalahap, primarily a resistance movement, became essentially an agrarian one. Its roots lay deep in the traditional land system of Central Luzon, a peonage system in which the *tao*, or common peasant, was exploited by feudal services, high rents, heavy taxation, and extortionate usury. The picture of Philippine poverty and oppression drawn by Katherine Mayo in her book "Isles of Fear" was only slightly exaggerated. Conditions of farm tenancy and crop-sharing in the Central Luzon provinces, which I know from personal experience, were especially onerous for tenants. During this century, too, the peasant has been increasingly depressed, owners sinking to tenants, and tenants to labourers. In 1903 about 80% of the cultivators owned their small plots of land, but by 1938

owners had dwindled to less than 50%. From 1918 to 1938 the number of Philippine farms fell from 1,520,026 to 804,268, whilst share tenants increased from 256,000 to about 548,000. This growing concentration of land ownership in the hands of a privileged few, with the corresponding depression of the mass of the peasants, was notable in Pampanga province, where less than 1 per cent. of the people owned over 120,000 hectares, and in Nueva Ecija where half of the cultivated land was owned by 10% of the landowners. Furthermore, whilst the lot of the debt-ridden tenant on the margin of starvation was bad enough, that of the landless farm labourer was worse, since his average wage before the war was only 50 centavos (2/1d a day). In Pampanga the wage was lower still, being only 20 to 30 centavos, or less than one shilling a day. It is no wonder that this province became a Huk stronghold. The Hukbalahap, indeed, is only the latest of a long number of manifestations of agrarian revolt in the Philippines from the 16th century onwards, the most serious of which was the Sakdalista rebellion of 1935 in Central Luzon. Both President Quezon and President Roxas have publicly recognised the national need to remedy the genuine grievances of the Luzon peasantry.

Previous risings had been commonly sporadic, disorganised, ill-armed, and poorly-led. But the wartime Huk was a large-scale unified movement, organized by trained leaders, armed with modern weapons and battle-disciplined. Above all, it reinforced peasant sentiment by patriotic ardour and a new political indoctrination. It was never a purely Communist organization, as frequently asserted, but was definitely Leftist, with both Socialists and Communists as prominent figures. Its political advisers were Pedro Abad Santos, a Socialist leader who died fighting the Japanese in 1945, and Dr. Vicente Lava, a liberal intellectual and formerly Professor of Political Economy at the University of the Philippines. Another political theorist was Mariano Balgos, labour leader and proletarian poet. The commander of the People's Army was Luis Taruc, former Manila bus driver who was a trade union organiser and editor of labour publications. None of these leaders were Communists. On the other hand, equally prominent were such members of the small Philippine Communist Party as Juan Feleo and Casto Alejandrino, who were Governors of the two Hukbalahap Provincial Governments established in Pampanga and Nueva Ecija. A school for political training sent out propagandists teaching Marxist and Leninist doctrines. On the whole, however, the elements of Communism taught and practised were on Chinese rather than Soviet lines. Yenan methods were used in the setting up of the local administrations in guerilla areas where the Japanese forces were

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spread too thinly to arrest this novel development of peasant democratic government.

The Huk held elections and appointed governors, mayors, and officials. "Huklandia," as it was called, became therefore "a state within a state," an autonomous region defying first the Laurel puppet Government and later the Commonwealth Government under Osmena and the Republic under Roxas.

The Huk leaders hoped, rather naively perhaps, that their organization and their local governments would receive some recognition upon the liberation of the Philippines. But the American Army displaced their officials, although a few mayors were retained at first by reason of their administrative abilities. The Huk then continued its opposition by both force of arms and legitimate political organization. It was the dominant element in the formation of a new political party called the Democratic Alliance in July 1945. This included a number of other guerilla groups and labour organizations, such as the large National Peasants Union of Luzon, the Committee on Labour Organization of Manila, the Communist Party united with the Socialist Party, and the Civil Liberties Union. The Alliance put forward a moderate democratic policy along labour and social service lines, with stress on agrarian reforms. Its most radical plank was government ownership of public utilities. It stood for immediate and complete independence, opposing the Philippine Trade (Bell) Act, and naturally took a strong stand against collaborators. It supported Osmena against Roxas in the May 1946 elections, and won 7 seats in Central Luzon. Elected to the National Assembly from Pampanga were Taruc, C-in-C of the Huk, and Yuson, a leader of the National Peasants Union. Yuson and other Alliance members were arrested by the Roxas Government, however, which refused, unconstitutionally it would seem, to allow the Alliance members to take their Assembly seats, along with three Osmenista Senators. This repression enabled the Roxas administration to secure the requisite majority of the Philippine Congress to pass the Bell Act and the accompanying constitutional amendment. Although the Huk's political activity has thus been circumscribed, the creation of a small but vigorous political opposition was a novel phenomenon in the Philippines that indicated a significant development.

Meanwhile, from towards the end of 1945 throughout 1946 a civil war smouldered between the Huks and the Government, with Taruc trying to make a bargain with the Government. Upon his election President Roxas took, however, a strong line, demanding, quite naturally, the surrender of arms by Huk forces. Equally naturally, the Huks refused to do so until they obtained certain

guarantees, since they were encountering bitter repression by the military police—who had fought the Huks for years as agents of the puppet government and had old scores to settle—and the civil guards which acted as armed forces supporting the re-establishment of the landlords. Sparks were added to the flames by the Malolos massacre in February 1945, when two Huk squadrons that had laid down their arms upon the demand of American Army troops, inspired by the Bulacan landlords, were ambushed on their way home by Bulacan Military Area guerillas representing the landlords, imprisoned, and clubbed to death. The guerilla leader, Macan, was arrested but later released and made mayor of Malolos. The memory of this incident, together with similar punitive raids on peasant villages by the military police in Pampanga and Nueva Ecija, made the Huks reluctant to surrender their arms without adequate guarantees against reprisals. Thus the situation paralleled the civil war in China between the Kuomintang Government and the Chinese Communists.

Serious clashes between the Huks and military police occurred in May last year, and again in July. Negotiations between Roxas and Taruc in July broke down owing to the distrust felt on both sides, and the publication of letters exchanged between them showed the impossibility of a compromise. Roxas extended the ultimatum for surrender of Huk arms from July to September, but refused to treat with Taruc, stated that lawlessness would be stamped out, and promised to send "an implacable force" against the Huks. Thus a strong force of Government troops was sent in November against the remaining Huks who, under Taruc's leadership, had entrenched themselves in the mountains about 60 miles north of Manila. A number of pitched battles were fought in this civil warfare. Many moderates, unwilling to engage in open rebellion against the national Government, had already surrendered their arms, so that only a band of the more uncompromising elements was left to engage in what was clearly an unequal struggle foredoomed to eventual failure. As desperation grew, moreover, lawlessness increased. Thus Mr. A. V. Hartendorp, former editor of the *Philippine Magazine* and an outstanding liberal leader, stated in a recent personal letter to me that, although he had sympathised with the Huks, this sympathy had been alienated by their use of terrorism in the later stages of their varied career.

The rise and fall of the Hukbalahap, however, was more than a picturesque incident of the war, the occupation, and their aftermath. Its fight against the Japanese had been completed. Its provincial governments were displayed, and its military forces dis-

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persed. Its work of land redistribution was swept away. Its legitimate political organization in the Democratic Alliance has been repressed. Yet time will probably show that its social, economic, and political influence has done much to revolutionize the Philippines. The forces which it stimulated remain as a national ferment. The peasants of Central Luzon have been awakened to a new political consciousness. Leftist ideas, disciplines, and parties have been thrust into Philippine politics. Above all, the Huk regime has made it difficult, if not impossible, to put the agrarian clock back to the old forms of feudalism. President Roxas has shrewdly recognised that repression alone is not enough, and has taken some measure already to lessen the injustices suffered by the Luzon peasantry. Last September he signed the Tenancy Act which improves, to some extent at least, the conditions of crop-sharing for the tenants. In October small expropriations of church properties were begun through the Rural Progress Administration. In November President Roxas ordered the expropriation of a large estate in Nueva Ecija, a former Huk stronghold, for redistribution to the landless peasants. Thus the Hukbalahap has served its primary purpose of forcing forward some amelioration of the peasant's lot. Without some of the agrarian reform which it advocated President Roxas will not be able to win the national unity and popular support which he requires urgently in order to tackle his tremendous task of rebuilding a devastated Philippines.

Australia's Place in World Telecommunications.

P. C. Greenland

Most people who were born round the turn of the century will probably still remember the rich contemporary blend of romanticism and imperialism which characterised the general attitude in those days towards the world telecommunication systems. Kipling's works exhibit it in many places. In one of his early books, *The Seven Seas*, there is a poem specifically entitled "The Deep Sea Cables," in which he draws a typically Kiplingesque contrast between the soundless darkness of the sea bed and the flutter of language in the cables, and hints at the international implications of the new mode of communication. Other writers were also quick to find emotional suggestiveness in such material, including particularly the strange lives of the cable operators at their far-flung posts of duty. Today we have moved a long way from all that. The international cable and wireless systems are taken pretty much for granted, and our feelings towards them, so far as we have any at all, are strictly practical. It is an interesting example of the rapidity with which technological progress is assimilated into the texture of daily life.

The International Significance.

None the less it is well to remember, especially if one has a responsible attitude towards international affairs, that telecommunication services have been a major issue in diplomacy and international commerce for a considerable period, and are an important subject of international discussion today. From the standpoint of defence they are also a vital factor, and are occupying an increasingly prominent place in the defence policies of the major powers. The conflicts of interest to which they have given rise have not, it is true, been regarded with much public attention; the questions involved have on the whole been of too technical a nature to be easily understood. The conflicts, however, have not in any way lacked reality because of that, and on occasion they have been decidedly serious. Developments tending to reduce the possibility of their emergence in the future are therefore commensurately worthy of notice.

The reasons for which telecommunication services have been a subject of diplomatic concern are not far to seek. They derive on the one hand from the great instrumental importance of such services in themselves, and on the other from the fact that large capital investments and valuable commercial rights have been involved. The first of these points it is hardly necessary to labour. It was brought out with considerable emphasis immediately the first permanently effective Atlantic cable was laid down in 1866. The ability to obtain prompt and secret information about events in remote parts of the world was quickly seen as a vital factor in international politics, and gave rise to keen international rivalry in the development of extended cable systems. Great Britain, it is interesting to remember, was a brilliant pioneer in the laying down of long-distance cables, and her enterprise in this direction gave her a long-continued advantage in international negotiations. The second of the points mentioned above is also fairly obvious. The operation of international telecommunication services was for a long time a lucrative branch of business, and one in which large financial interests contended vigorously in many countries of the world for privileged trading rights. Competition of this type was frequently a source of serious diplomatic tension, and is still not altogether a thing of the past. International telecommunication services, in short, essentially imply international arrangements, and when irreconcilable conflicts of interest arise there is a strong tendency to look for settlement through diplomatic channels. There are few branches of business, in fact, in which questions of national prestige and sovereignty are more directly and immediately involved.

There is another reason, too, for suggesting that the telecommunication matters are of special interest from an international standpoint. This is that world telecommunication services represent on the technical side a notable example of close and successful international co-operation. There can indeed be few fields in which intimate and exact international understandings are more necessary, or in which they have on the whole been more happily achieved. The transmission of messages from one country to another commonly involves the use of intermediate and terminal circuits controlled by different national authorities, and presupposes a high degree of technical co-ordination over all stages of the route. The immense volume of traffic handled on world circuits in pre-war days, and the rate at which specialized communication facilities were being provided, is striking evidence of how effectively the problems of international co-operation can be dealt with at the purely technical level.

The long succession of instruments in which the international understandings on telecommunication matters are embodied constitutes an extraordinarily interesting chapter in the literature of international agreement. The first of these documents was a convention of 1865, under which the International Telegraph Union was brought into existence. The Union in turn set up the International Bureau of the Telegraph Administrations, and the Bureau, located at Berne and known now as the Bureau of the International Telecommunication Union, is functioning today as the international secretariat on telecommunication matters generally. The original convention was superseded in 1875 by the Convention of St. Petersburg, a remarkable document which, though itself eventually superseded, still operates in effect as the basis of world arrangements in the telecommunications field. It was conceived mainly with reference to the co-ordination of the European land-line systems, but the principles which it enunciated were so broad in their generality that they became the framework within which most subsequent agreements were effected. Other great conferences followed at more or less regular intervals, notably the Berlin Radiotelegraph Conference of 1903 (not strictly a conference of the Union), the conferences held in Paris following the 1914-1918 war (again not conferences of the Union), the Madrid Conference of 1932, the Cairo Conference of 1938 and special international conferences held in Moscow in 1945 and Bermuda in 1946. The most important of these was the Madrid Conference of 1932, which resulted in the formation of the present International Telecommunication Union. In addition to the main conferences there have been a great many bi-lateral and multi-lateral conferences on special branches and aspects of telecommunications activity. The decisions of these conferences are embodied in administrative agreements of various types, which though not of the same status as diplomatic documents are important and effective expressions of international understanding. The texts of the Conventions proper have been published in English by H.M. Stationery Office, and summaries of most of the extremely numerous administrative agreements are included in the League of Nations Treaty Series. An admirable short survey of the whole field is provided in Sir Osborne Mance's *International Telecommunications*, published by the Oxford University Press for Chatham House.

Broadly the position today is that the International Telecommunications Union is the world authority on telecommunications matters. This is a body of essentially the same character as its predecessor the International Telegraph Union, but the Convention of

1932 by which it was established gives it powers in relation to telephony and radiocommunication additionally to those exercised by the superseded body in relation to telegraphy. The two added areas of subject matter were formerly controlled by separate world authorities, which in effect amalgamated with the Telegraph Union to form the new organisation. Practically all the countries of the world to-day belong to the International Telecommunications Union, though the exceptions are important. Australia is a member.

The British Commonwealth and Australia.

Against this international background it is interesting to take note of certain important changes now in process of being effected within the British Commonwealth of Nations and Australia in particular.

The causes which operated to bring about these changes were many, but the chief of them was the economic impact of radio on the cable systems. The capital cost of establishing international radio services is much less than that of laying down submarine cables, and operating costs are no higher, if as high. When the beam radio services began to function in 1928 it was clear that some understanding would have to be reached if the cable companies were not to be forced into early liquidation. Because of the fact that the cable systems provided the only completely set mode of communication, and were for that reason extremely important from a strategic viewpoint, and because of their practical efficiency and immense traffic carrying capacity, it was felt to be nationally desirable that a basis should be found for their retention. An effort was made in 1928 to secure this through a merger of the cable and wireless interests in Great Britain, when the company now known as Cable & Wireless Limited was formed, but the expedient did not work out satisfactorily. It eventually became clear that the only real solution was the complete integration and nationalization of the cable and wireless services on an Empire-wide basis. Australia and New Zealand, interestingly enough, were the authors of this plan. It was the only logical way out, and the logic of the facts was recognised. The plan was agreed to by the United Kingdom and Dominion Governments in 1945 and 1946.

The plan itself was a really notable conception. It provided both for integration on the widest basis, which was essential from the technical standpoint, and for full regional autonomy, which in the eyes of the Dominion Governments was also a fundamental desideratum. Briefly its elements were that the United Kingdom Government was to buy out the private cable and wireless interests in

Great Britain, which controlled the major portion of the Empire cable and wireless systems, and the Governments of the Dominions and India were to buy out the private operators within their own territories. The various services taken over were then to be united with those operated by the governments themselves, and the whole system was to be placed under the control of a group of independent but closely interlocked national authorities, operating either as specially constituted statutory bodies or as special divisions of the various national postal administrations. Each authority was to be responsible for the operation of the services within its territorial limits, and unification was to be secured by the provision of permanent machinery for co-ordination and mutual consultation. Most of this plan has now been implemented, and the remainder is well on the way.

The new operating authority in Australia is the Overseas Telecommunications Commission. The Commission was set up under the Overseas Telecommunications Act 1946, and took up its functions at the end of last year. At the time of the formation of the Commission the overseas wireless services in Australia were operated by Amalgamated Wireless (Australasia) Limited, and the cables were controlled by a divisional organization directly representing Cable and Wireless Limited, the English company by which the Empire cable system was owned. The wireless services operated by Amalgamated Wireless comprised on the one hand the coastal radio service, which handles traffic between Australia and the Islands and traffic with ships at sea, and on the other the beam wireless service, maintains direct communication with Great Britain, the United States and other overseas countries. The cable services were a single system based on cables reaching Australia via the Indian Ocean, the Timor Sea and the Pacific, and likewise handled traffic to and from all parts of the world.

Under the plan contemplated in the 1946 Act, the Commission will eventually own and control all the overseas telecommunications plant in Australia, i.e., it will operate both the wireless and the cables. So far as the wireless services are concerned this stage has already been reached. The coastal and beam services were purchased outright from Amalgamated Wireless, which handed over control to the Commission on 1st February of this year. Negotiations for the acquisition of the cable equipment in Australia are in progress at the present time, and will probably be completed during the next few months. The cable and wireless services will then be operated as a unified and governmentally-owned system. This system will function in close and intimate co-ordination with the internal telegraph and telephone systems of the Commonwealth,

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operated by the Postmaster-General's Department. Externally it will interlock with the systems operated by the authorities set up by the other partner governments, and through them will be linked with the telegraph and telephone systems throughout the Empire.

Inter-regional co-ordination, a central objective of the total plan, will be effected through the Commonwealth Telecommunications Board in Great Britain. All the partner governments will have direct and equal representation on the Board. Its numerous functions will include the conduct of research on telecommunications matters generally, and the co-ordination and facilitation of research on the part of the various national authorities. In this field alone it has a very important task before it.

It is a pity to pass over in so summary a way the long and extremely interesting chapter of history which the introduction of these new arrangements will bring to a close. As was indicated at the outset, the establishment of the world cable services was a brilliant effort of English technical and financial enterprise, and the vicissitudes of the very numerous companies by which the services were developed would also make an interesting study. The names of some of these organizations have gathered about them a rich complex of associations, and are part of the common vocabulary throughout the Empire. It is a pity, too, to say nothing about the interesting possibilities which lie ahead. The operation of the Empire cable and wireless systems as a unified whole, the pooling of technical and financial resources and the adoption of a completely flexible basis for the handling of traffic should open up a new era in telecommunication services. In due time this should mean improved and more varied facilities for users, which in turn should promote closer inter-dominion and world relationships.

From the standpoint of international affairs the new arrangements are of considerable significance. There will be no sacrifice of regional autonomy—that in fact will be considerably strengthened—but the British Commonwealth of Nations will henceforth speak with a closer unity of policy on telecommunications matters, and these, as has been emphasized already, are a frequent and important subject of international discussion. Moreover as the period of private ownership is now closed, the danger of international complications through efforts quite legitimately made by foreign interests to enter into competition with private operators of telecommunication services will be removed.

Forthcoming Conferences.

In the sphere of international discussion the effect of the new

arrangements will probably be felt almost immediately. A long series of important international conferences is to be held in the United States this year, including a Plenipotentiary Conference for the revision of the International Telecommunications Convention adopted at Madrid in 1932. Technical progress in the telecommunications field is extremely rapid, and the fifteen years which have passed since the Madrid Conference was held have witnessed enormous developments not provided for in the Convention. The other major conferences are to be an International Radiocommunications Conference, an International Conference on Short-wave Broadcasting, and a meeting of the International Consultative Committee on Telegraphs. In addition the United States is taking advantage of the opportunity afforded by the presence of the world delegates to hold an International Meeting on Radio Aids to Marine Navigation, another field in which recent developments have been of radical importance. The delegates attending the conferences on behalf of the United Kingdom, Dominion and Indian Governments will be acting for the first time as the representatives of a completely nationalized group of telecommunication authorities. Australia will be represented at all the conferences.

The problems to be dealt with at the conferences are of great interest from a technical standpoint, and some of them are of considerably wider significance. The International Conference on Short-wave Broadcasting, for instance, though it will have no political powers, will be dealing with a subject of first-class political importance. The Consultative Committee on Telegraphs, which will tackle the complicated problem of rates, will also be making decisions of political interest, and will have to struggle with the ubiquitous problem of finding a stable monetary unit for international accounting, a question fundamental to the financial side of telecommunications activity. And all the conferences will be concerned in one way or other with the master-problem of world radio generally, namely the provision of space on the radio frequency spectrum for the innumerable national and functional claimants for frequencies. This is pre-eminently an example of what the economists mean when they talk about the allocation of scarce resources which have alternative uses. Within the limits of the spectrum there is no possibility of meeting anything remotely approaching total needs, and no conceivable principle of allocation can avoid immediately raising extremely delicate questions of national interest and prestige.

REVIEW ARTICLE

The Absolute Weapon.¹

This book is a symposium written by members of the Yale Institute of International Studies. The Institute is the most successful of all the bodies conducting research in international affairs in the United States of America; successful because its members concentrate mainly on the intellectual problems, do fundamental thinking and do not confine themselves to fact-finding as is fashionable in America. It is no use finding facts unless we use them as a basis of thought. Facts should challenge thought and, unless the thinking is sound, accuracy in fact is of minor importance.

The atom bomb is the greatest challenge to mankind that has ever appeared. What is he going to do about it? The concrete facts are relatively simple. The degree of destruction which can be wrought by it is so great that exact measurement is not necessary. We have a menace to our civilization. How will it impinge on our social structure? How can we meet it? What adjustments can be made so as to avoid its use? What covenants or charters or organisations will afford mutual protection? The answers require not a mere finding of facts but exhaustive analysis of the conditions in which the bomb may be used.

The essence of the book is contained in the two chapters by the Editor, Dr. Bernard Brodie, on "War in the Atomic Age" and "Implication of Military Policy," the chapter by Mr. Arnold Wolfers on "The Atomic Bomb in Soviet-American Relations" and the chapter on "International Control of Atomic Weapons" by Mr. W. T. R. Fox. Dr. Brodie is a foremost thinker and writer in the United States on questions of military policy and strategy. Mr. Wolfers is President of one of the Yale Colleges and an authority on political and strategic problems in Europe; he is Swiss by birth. Mr. Fox is the author of a successful book called *The Super Powers*. Other chapters of almost equal interest are contributed by Mr. F. S. Dunn, Director of the Institute, and Professor Percy S. Corbett, Head of the School of Political Science at Yale.

1. *The Absolute Weapon. Atomic Power and World Order*. Edited by Bernard Brodie. Yale University Institute of International Studies, 1946. (New York: Harcourt and Brace. pp. 214).

Dr. Brodie's two chapters are tour de force of clear analysis and exposition. He puts eight postulates, which I will deal with in order:—

1. The power of the bomb is such that any city in the world can be destroyed by from one to ten bombs;

This statement is based mainly on the areas devastated at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Dr. Oppenheimer stated that the Nagasaki bomb would have taken out ten square miles. A large city like New York covers 365 square miles, but New York could be entirely disorganised and rendered incapable of playing any part if 100 square miles were devastated.

2. No adequate defence against the bomb exists and the possibilities of its existence in the future are exceedingly remote.

Dr. Brodie discounts the soldiers and others who rely on the fact that defensive weapons have always been found in the past. But, though we have organised means of defensive reaction or counter attack, we have not prevented the release of weapons or prevented them from doing the damage intended. For instance, we have not got a static defence against the bullet. The bullet gets through and hits a certain proportion of the men. We can prevent its hitting too many by suiting our tactics to it. If the atomic bomb hits the target, however, the damage is decisive. The only form of defence possible is to attack the vehicle which carries it. In the future this may be a rocket fired from 3,000 miles away. At present, the aeroplane is the only carrier. Dr. Brodie contends that, if the enemy were determined to score hits through aeroplane action, he could do so. Though an air force has, on numerous occasions, had command of the air of a pretty complete character, such command has never been sufficient to prevent a few planes from getting through and these few, if carrying the atom bomb, are enough to do significant damage and cripple the enemy.

3. The atomic bomb not only places an extraordinary military premium upon the development of new types of carriers, but also greatly extends the destructive range of existing carriers.

Here again the enormous damage done by one hit makes it economic to develop new forms of carriers. The V.2 was expensive but erratic and inaccurate, and the damage was so small that it did not pay. But the fruits of success with the bomb are so enormous that a much more expensive rocket for throwing the bomb great distances would still be economical and, in the case of the bomb, accuracy is not so important. The range of the plane carrying a bomb can also be immensely increased—indeed, if the crew are willing to do a long-range Kamikaze act, a bomb might be dropped

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6,000 miles from the base from which the plane started. "If this is so," Dr. Brodie says, "any world power is able, from bases within its own territory, to destroy most of the cities of any other power. It is not necessary to seize any advanced bases close to enemy territory as a pre-requisite to effective use of the bomb."

4. Superiority in air force, though a more effective safeguard in itself than a superiority in naval or land forces, nevertheless fails to guarantee security.

The reason for this has been given above, i.e., that very inferior air forces can penetrate to the enemy targets if they are prepared to make the necessary sacrifices. An air force, even if inferior, could destroy the cities in a given territory and it has thus, for all practical purposes, the effect of command of the air if it will disregard a high proportion of losses. Superiority was necessary for successful strategic bombing with ordinary bombs because the number which had to be dropped was so great—but not for the atomic bomb.

5. Superiority in number of bombs is not in itself a guarantee of strategic superiority in atomic bomb warfare.

The reason for this is that the first few bombs which get home on the target are adequate to finish the enemy and the surplus is of little value. "If 2,000 bombs in the hands of one party are enough to destroy entirely the economy of the other, the fact that one side has 6,000 available and the other 2,000 is of small significance. Thus an overwhelmingly strong industrial system does not give a crucial advantage.

6. The new potentialities which the atomic bomb gives to sabotage must not be exaggerated.

This depends on certain technical considerations, which it would be difficult for me to pursue at length. Brodie believes that, in order to hold the crucial masses and contain them safely, something very large is necessary, not something which can be carried in a despatch case. He says that the police agencies of America are sufficient to cope with such a menace. He allows for the fact that new methods may be devised for making a smaller bomb or breaking it up into component parts to be reassembled. But, of course, he does not advert to the problem of detection as it would present itself in Australia, where the conditions are very different.

7. In relation to the destructive powers of the bomb, world resources of raw materials for its production must be considered abundant.

"Estimates of the amount of uranium available in the Earth's crust vary between four and seven parts per million. The element

is very widely distributed, there being a ton of it present in each cubic mile of sea water, about one-seventh of an ounce per ton (average) in all granite and basalt rocks which together comprise about 95% by weight of the Earth's crust. There is more uranium in the Earth's crust than cadmium, bismuth, silver, mercury or iodine and it is about 1,000 times as prevalent as gold."

Concentrations are, however, few in number and there are only four concentrated deposits in substantial quantity: Great Bear Lake, Canada; Belgian Congo; Colorado and Czecho-Slovakia. Fairly extensive deposits exist in Madagascar, India and Russian Turkestan. "There is far more than enough fissionable material in known deposits," he concludes, "than is necessary to blow up all the cities of the world." The great military value will undoubtedly stimulate extraction; the metal is sufficiently prevalent to make extraction pay while the cost of mining is so small a fraction of the cost of the bomb that poor deposits are available for extraction. Thorium is also fissionable and is much more plentiful than uranium.

At first, there may be some manoeuvring to get control of the concentrated sources of supply. The Belgian supply may cause some heart-burning but the first products U.235 and PU.239 are extremely stable and this will enable accumulations to go on. The bomb will, in any case, never be scarce enough to spare any nation against which it is used against devastation. While it is possible that a great increase may occur in the power of the bomb, Brodie does not think it likely. In fact, the strength of the present bomb is adequate to satisfy the most exacting aggressor.

8. Regardless of American decisions concerning retention of its present secret, other Powers besides Britain and Canada will possess the ability to produce within a period of five to ten years hence.

I need not elaborate this, for it is practically admitted on all sides. The only secret alleged is the industrial "know-how" as the Americans elegantly put it. But, as five different methods of applying the basic knowledge to produce the bomb exist and all were successful, it seems absurd to imagine that one of them will not be discovered. From an engineering point of view, the bomb is gadgetry. The only point is whether the disclosure of the whole secret will promote the acceptance of a scheme to control atomic energy and outlaw the bomb. It seems clear that Russia will not accept regulation until it can start in a position of parity with the U.S.A. though there are many other things, e.g., their adhesion to the veto which prevents a reasonable scheme of regulation. The question is emphatically not one for our grandchildren but for ourselves.

On the foundation supplied by these postulates, Dr. Brodie pro-

ceeds in the second paper to draw the implications of military policy. Having stated that the use of the bomb may finish a war in a few days and that the loss of life in this physical destruction will be far greater than we have experienced before, he goes on to his main argument that the main and the only deterrent to the use of the bomb is the fact that another nation has the power of immediate retaliation with, of course, the immense destruction of life and property. For a day or two, the destruction in each of the warring countries would exceed the damage done by strategic bombing in Germany during the late war. This fear of instant retaliation is the factor which may and should prevent it from being used. But for that purpose, we must arrange for multilateral possession of the bomb with determination to retaliate if it is once used by an aggressor. If the bomb can be used without fear of retaliation, it will clearly encourage aggression.

The monopoly of the possession of the bomb now belongs to the United States and, though nobody except perhaps the Soviet believes that the United States intends to use it, yet it is affecting diplomacy, naturally because the only defence to it—retaliation—is not yet available. But it is pointed out that the most dangerous situation is one of concealed monopoly which might exist if a party to an international agreement broke it secretly. Thus every international agreement for the outlawry of the bomb must be 100% effective.

The outlines of a defensive programme in the atomic age are then discussed. There are three possibilities which must be provided for:—

- (a) a war fought without the bomb. Fear of retaliation may lead each combatant to forego the use of the bomb. In this case, the war will proceed on the conventional, strategic and tactical lines;
- (b) a war in which atomic bombs would be used only considerably after commencement;
- (c) a war in which bombs were used at the commencement.

The first possibility is not very likely. The fear of the bomb and retaliation, if strong enough, would prevent the outbreak of war. But, of course, the fear of the bomb may have the same effect as the fear of the German Air Force—it may lead to a Great Power forcing concessions and improving its strategic position without war as Hitler did. This, indeed, is its greatest danger and is possible even if both sides possess the bomb. Nations will be inclined to make concessions in distant areas for fear of the horror of atomic warfare, but these concessions may build up power and lead to an intolerable situation. If, however, hostilities do break out, the pressure to use the bomb suddenly will be irresistible. The refusal of

all sides to use gas is not analogous because the use of gas promised no clear military advantage as the bomb does.

What then should the United States do? In this section, the author emphasises that a defensive policy is necessary. The maxim that the best defensive is a strong offence must not be erected into a dogma. The offensive blow will have been delivered. What is the necessary reaction to it? To answer this, we must realise that the destruction by the bomb itself does not end the war unless it crows us and we give up. The enemy must occupy the country and take over the government. The attacked country must therefore have forces to resist. Concentrations on big cities and industrial installations are vulnerable to the atomic bomb. Defensive forces must therefore be organised so as to be independent, for supply and support, of urban communities and their industries. The armies must be ready with all necessary replacements for the power of production may be destroyed by the bomb.

Thus, three types of force will be required:—

- (a) the force reserved for the retaliating attack with the power for maintaining the complete isolation from the national community;
- (b) a force to invade and occupy enemy territory;
- (c) the force for repelling invasion and restoring devastated areas.

The force set apart for invasion must be relatively small, completely professional and trained to the uttermost. The force to repel invasion must be large, virtually a citizen force with some training. These requirements will involve a change in military thought and organisation and the author sees no sign of it in the United States of America. In his view, certain tasks still remain for the Navy to do, depending to some extent on the question whether an aircraft carrying a bomb can be launched from a carrier. At present, this is not possible. Finally, the author discusses methods of reducing vulnerability of targets by dispersing the cities. The plans for wholesale dispersal in the U.S.A., he rules out on account of the cost—300 billion dollars—and the small difference they make to vulnerability. He says, however, that much can be done:—

- (a) to sustain the power of retaliation and thus deter the offensive use of the bomb;
- (b) to reduce casualties or destruction.

The former may be achieved as follows:—

- (i) by removing the industries necessary for bomb warfare out of the cities;
- (ii) by breaking up the plants necessary into small units;
- (iii) by removal of population of cities into suburban areas;
- (iv) by rearranging essential services geographically;
- (v) by ascertaining by tests the resistance of various materials.

Nothing, however, can spare the world from devastation and horror if the bomb is to be prepared and used. We must, therefore, not only concern ourselves with the more fundamental considerations of eliminating war or, at least, of reducing the chances of its recurrence. If the bomb is used, great nations may be able to save themselves from subjugation, but not from a destruction so colossal as to spell ruin. All the United States can do is to make it possible that she is not a tempting target to an aggressor. But the effort and cost are enormous. We have not only to make the bomb so that we can retaliate, but we must be prepared for a war without the bomb with its sea, land and air components and a national defence army. Can the United States stand it? Can any country stand it? Can Australia stand such sacrifices as will be involved?

The chapter by Arnold Wolfers on "The Atomic Bomb in Soviet-American Relations" is less clear cut than that of Dr. Brodie. It is also inconclusive; in the nature of the case this is inevitable, but the chapter is very subtle and candid. Wolfers admits what less honest controversialists like Ralph Ingersoll deny—that the two Powers likely to be antagonistic are the Soviet and the United States of America. This bipolarity (as these writers call it) is dangerous, for the two Powers cannot evade the issues or make scapegoats of others. On the other hand, the suspicions and fears it engenders are likely to destroy confidence and intensify hostility.

The author first considers the question whether the possession of the monopoly confers any advantage on the United States in diplomatic or bargaining power. It has, in fact, not made Russia more friendly, nor is it likely to do so. In fact, Russia will probably not play ball while she is inferior. A preventive war is, he says, unthinkable and, if it succeeded, what could we do with Russia? The bomb is rather an impediment than an advantage to our diplomacy. He scouts the idea that it would be desirable to set up a world government and hand the bomb to it. Even though Russia were a member of a world federation, nothing could prevent her from trying to obtain atomic power. A war to set up a world government would be absurd and nothing but continual coercion by the world state would prevent any member from making and using the bomb.

Is it then possible in any way to bargain the monopoly for any promise of control or security? Unfortunately, the mere existence of the bomb prevents a return to pre-atomic psychology. Violation of any agreement is a possibility which will loom large. Mr. Stassen's proposal for the internationalisation of atomic power by placing all bombs under an international police force would be of little use because, under the present Charter with the veto, they could not be used against a Great Power. In any case, each Great

Power would be compelled to race for the control of the bombs in the possession of the police force because exclusive possession by the other would make it defenceless. The conclusion is that, until both Powers have equal access, no bargain or arrangement is possible. This is the conclusion of the Consultants Committee.

We must realise that a revolutionary change in the position of the United States will have been wrought when once Russia has the bomb. America is, on the whole, more vulnerable than Russia, and the Russian autocratic system gives them considerable advantages in using it and avoiding some of the disastrous consequences of its use by others. The bomb thus favours a process of strategic expansion by Russia similar to that exercised by Hitler, and there is some likelihood of the United States' accepting such expansion by appeasement. If the United States refused to appease Russia, an unbridled armament race between the two countries might very well be promoted. In that case, evasion of international agreements for control is most likely. These dangers are inherent in the nature of the bomb.

Lines of defence are then suggested:—

- (a) the improvement of Soviet-American relations not by one-sided concessions but by wise statesmanship, but every concession should not be regarded as appeasement;
- (b) international agreements and control through United Nations. As the Russians regard the veto as their only safeguard, we must accept it, and, as they have accepted the Charter, we must not try to scrap it and substitute something else, e.g., world government;
- (c) prepare ourselves for retaliation in kind.

Which country has the best chance of surviving in a retaliatory war is not clear, but though the autocratic system gives Russia certain advantages these will diminish in a longer war; in such a war, the puppet governments which Russia has set up may be a disadvantage to her. Small States are in a desperate position and may hasten to join one or other of the big Powers. If they had some atomic power, however, their weakness could be remedied and if the Great Powers damage each other too much the military strength of the Smaller Powers may be enhanced. Mr. Wolfers does not afford much comfort.

The chapter on "International Control of Atomic Warfare" by Mr. Fox can be dealt with rather shortly, not because it is unimportant but because its conclusions can be summarised. A good deal of its space is devoted to disposing of the arguments for a world state as the only remedy for the bomb. This is very effectively done. In dealing with the demand for immediate releasing of secrets, he agrees, as every sensible man must, that it is legitimate to use the

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interval to obtain an international agreement for control. He lays down the principles as follows:—

- (a) the control problem is inseparable from the general problem of relations between the Great Powers. He also admits that the antagonism is between the two Powers—the United States and Russia;
- (b) the Powers, and especially the Great Powers, must be prepared to accept a substantial narrowing in their range of free choice of policy;
- (c) any legal agreement limiting the right of States to produce, possess or use atomic armaments must be self-enforcing, that is to say: if we outlaw the bomb, we must provide for inspection and penalties for violation;
- (d) the agreement must in fact as well as in law be binding in the United States as well as in other countries.

These necessarily by-pass the veto. He takes refuge in Article 57 of the Charter which affirms the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs. He contends that collective defence includes the right to negotiate bilateral or multi-lateral agreements in which the possessors of the bomb undertake the obligation of automatic retaliation. He thus supports two main suggestions; first, the adoption of the report of the Board of Consultants which advocates an International Commission to control all atomic energy so that possession by any nation without licence is illegal; the second, the pact for automatic retaliation if the bomb is used.

We must now turn to the proposals for the control of atomic energy which are now before the Atomic Commission of the United Nations. In this, the United States have taken a position of leadership which is quite out of line with their traditional policy. The foundation of the United States plan is found in the Report of the Committee of Consultants which considered the subject in the earlier part of last year and presented its Report on March 16, 1946. It was released to the public by the Secretary of State on 28th March. This Committee was presided over by Mr. Lillienthal, Chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority, and contained a number of scientists and publicists.

The essence of the Report of the Commission is that it recommends complete control of the production of atomic materials from the mining to the complete product by an International Authority. This International Authority will then control the use of the materials which are made. This step is, of course, a bold one, when one considers the repulsion expressed universally in the United States against the Australian proposal for an International Air Authority in 1944. The main reason for this departure is the difficulty of inspection. The scientists were in despair of ever finding an efficient system of inspection because the processes of producing

atomic energy could go on in all sorts of ways, but, if an international authority were given sole control over atomic materials, then the mining, production or the use of atomic materials by any authority other than the international authority, except under its licence, would ipso facto be a violation of the agreement. It is easier to control a violation of this kind and to ascertain whether it is occurring than it would be to police a mere prohibition of preparation for atomic warfare.

The Commission will, therefore, have complete control of all materials, primary production plants and strategic distribution and will have the exclusive right to conduct research in the field of atomic explosives. It will have power of inspection and adequate egress and ingress for all qualified representatives of the authority. Atomic materials which are not dangerous can be licensed to national and private undertakings. The Committee of Consultants disclosed for the first time that atomic material could be denatured; thus its distribution is safe, but the Baruch proposals say that even the issue of denatured materials must be subject to suitable safeguards.

There are two important qualifications to these proposals. The first is that the United States is only prepared to yield an international control to the extent required by each phase of the progress towards an agreement on the form of international control, and the second is that, when the system of control has been agreed upon and put into effective operation, the manufacture of atomic bombs should cease. It is not desirable to pursue the further developments of the subject and the negotiations of the United Nations Atomic Commission, much of which is still confidential. The ominous fact is that a pact for the control of this devastating weapon is not yet in sight.

—F. W. Eggleston.

Book Reviews.

A SHORT HISTORY OF JAPAN. By A. L. Sadler, 1946. (Sydney: Angus & Robertson. pp. 378).

From the ranks of princes and nobles, great warriors and statesmen, the historian inevitably selects his *dramatis personae*. He deals with remarkable men and remarkable events, and cannot linger over the doings of those humble folk who along the cool sequestered vale of life have kept the noiseless tenour of their way. Japanese history has been described as essentially the history of a ruling caste; and if Professor Sadler says little in his book about the Japanese people, it is, as he explains, for the reason that they have played little part in the development of the country and its administration. Perhaps intense loyalty to the ruler and to the family has been so developed in the "common man" of Japan as to make impossible any real sense of national responsibility or of loyalty to the community at large: sovereign-worship and ancestor-worship make good subjects but poor citizens.

With the conversion to Buddhism and the gradual spread of Chinese civilisation, from the fifth century A.D. onwards, the authentic story of Japan may be said to begin. The involved and often grotesque mythology of the earlier period can scarcely be regarded as sober history. Most of us, indeed, will be glad to leave it behind and to breathe the less rarefied atmosphere of the age that opens with the constitution of Shotoku Taishi (604 A.D.). To the student of European medieval history, the pattern of the millennium that follows, roughly 600 to 1600 A.D., will be seen familiar enough. No foreign wars with their noise affrighted Japan, if we except the attempted Kublai Khan invasion at the end of the thirteenth century; but on the other hand her turbulent warrior families rarely allowed the internal peace to remain unbroken long. Fierce baronial quarrels and insurrections rent the country every now and then, preceded and followed by a plentiful crop of murders, assassinations and executions. Europe, too, has all too often witnessed mass-murder, but only in Japan has the traditional capacity for self-destruction led to mass-suicide. Prince Yamashiro (seventh century) saw fit to commit suicide with twenty-three members of his family. After the defeat in 1333 of the last of the Hojo Regents, Takatoki, his family and eight hundred of his retainers followed him to the grave. That the Japanese still hold their own lives as cheap as their enemies' we soon discovered in the course of our recent war with them in the Pacific.

The peculiar Japanese custom of abdication, because it seems to have been the rule rather than the exception, perhaps deserves special mention. By this means a ruler, either Emperor or Shogun, would make way for his successor, in order either to retire into dignified seclusion or, as sometimes happened, more effectively to exercise authority in the background. Thus although the Emperor Go-Shirakawa reigned only for two years, 1156-8, and then retired, yet as Ho-o or Retired Emperor his influence made itself felt until 1192. Another retired Emperor, in the seventeenth century, survived to see no less than four of his sons reign one after the other in his stead. A Shogun might also abdicate and assume the title of Ogosho.

The author deals fully with the halcyon period of the Tokugawa Shogunate, from 1600 onwards, but more briefly, of set purpose, with the modern age since 1853, when Commodore Perry first knocked at the door. Professor Sadler is to be thanked for giving us this short history, dealing as it does with a nation which, perhaps more than any other, should receive the close study of Australians. "In the study of Japanese behaviour," as Sir George Sansom has remarked, "we must expect to find underlying the most familiar appearances a reality peculiarly and intensely native to the Japanese soil, and not easy to comprehend in terms of our own occidental experience." In their own interest, if for no higher reason, Australians should strive to comprehend.

The book would probably be of even greater value if the author did not so readily assume, as apparently he does, a familiarity with the Japanese way of life which most Australian readers are unlikely to possess. When a new edition appears in due course, perhaps the inclusion of a glossary might be considered, to assist the reader, defining such terms as cha-no-yu and No, Kambaku and Taiko, seppuku and junshi, kuge and daimyo, Bakufu, Tairo, Hatamoto, and a score of others. Professor Sadler himself treads with assurance the labyrinth of Japanese nomenclature; but his readers may sometimes find it difficult to follow him, more particularly since the Japanese have an inveterate habit of making changes of name whenever it suits them. The first Tokugawa Shogun, for example—a notable biography of whom Professor Sadler produced a few years ago—, received one set of names at birth, assumed another set on attaining adult status, a third on marriage, and eventually ended up as Tokugawa-Ieyasu.

If a personal note may be intruded, the present reviewer would mention that he owes his interest in Japanese history, and incidentally a good deal of what little he knows about the subject, to a voyage in the Far East in Professor Sadler's company nearly twenty years ago. He remembers how often he was referred with approval to a book which later he came to know as a fascinating series of brief essays, namely B. H. Chamberlain's "Things Japanese." As a means of preparing the ground for a fuller comprehension of the "Short History," this reviewer can think of no exercise more profitable than a perusal of "Things Japanese," not omitting the articles headed Mikado, Shogun, Government, Abdication and Adoption. Equipped with the information that Chamberlain can give him, the reader will be better able to appreciate Professor Sadler's achievement.

—T. N. M. Buesst.

ON GOVERNING COLONIES: W. R. Crocker. (London, George Allen and Unwin. pp. 152).

Mr. Crocker has written a vigorous and outspoken book. He discusses colonial policy in Africa from the standpoint of the observer who knows many parts of Africa well and has the additional advantage of being in no doubt as to the fundamental principles of a good colonial policy.

There is an air of independence about this book that sets it apart from the majority of works on colonial questions. Mr. Crocker himself condemns most academic studies of colonial problems (especially those written by women); he is equally impatient with critics who think of colonies as hotbeds of exploitation and with those who clamour for economic development. The demand for self-government of colonial subjects is dismissed as the vociferation of well-meaning idealists. American criticisms of the colonial policies of the Powers are curtly set on one side with the remark that they will be of more value when the United States has solved its own negro problem and eradicated American financial imperialism from Central America.

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Just what does Mr. Crocker himself stand for? Actually, his conclusions are not very different from those of modern anthropologists. He attacks the problem of colonial policy at the native end. His fear is that the pace of economic, social and cultural change being forced on the natives will prove to be too rapid,—that native society will be destroyed, instead of being gradually adjusted to new conditions.

Mr. Crocker's case is based less on anthropological knowledge than on a scathing comparison between the kind of civilization which the colonial Powers themselves possess and the traditional African way of life. Western civilisation he condemns as "the unhappiest age in recorded history." Africa, he admits, is poor, but absolute poverty is less than in much of Europe and Asia. African society (so he contends) is more contented and stable than European society. On the basis of these generalisations, he asks whether the colonial Powers really have anything to offer the natives? Similarly, he deplores the lust for possessions that has gripped so many of the natives and drawn them into a materialist economy.

Mr. Crocker's own idea of a good policy may be set out briefly. He himself writes that, "The starting point is the people, the real people and what they need." What is needed will naturally differ from place to place. But what is "needed" and how are "needs" to be evaluated?

Apparently what is envisaged is that different needs will arise in different societies as they are adjusted to changing conditions. The emphasis therefore should be on developing an integrated policy for each area, with the basic factor always being the improvement of agriculture, medical services, justice, public finance and economic security, not in accordance with European ideas of "development," but in accordance with the changing attitudes and demands of the natives themselves.

The book contains valuable detailed chapters comparing British, French, and Belgian policies in the African colonies. These chapters sum up present policies with greater approval than the general contentions of the book might have led a reader to expect. But, having been an administrator himself, Mr. Crocker is thoroughly out of patience with those who preserve a guilty conscience about colonies, quite convinced of the goodwill of most officers in the field and completely disgusted with American and Russian criticisms of policies which, whatever their errors, have been based on "attitudes of responsibility" towards colonial peoples.

—J. M. Ward.

JAPAN'S PROSPECT. Edited by Douglas G. Haring. 1946. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. pp. XIV-474).

Contributors: Edward A. Ackerman, William Henry Chamberlain, Merle Fainsod, Carl J. Friedrich, Douglas G. Haring, Talcott Parsons, G. Nye Steiger, Seiyei Wakukawa, Frederick M. Watkins.

This is an omnibus volume of high quality. Under the editorship of Douglas G. Haring, who is Professor of Anthropology, Syracuse University, the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Affairs, in cooperation with the Harvard University Press, has brought together a team of all the talents to present a general picture of Japan—past history, current aspects and the likely shape of her future. The link between the various distinguished authors was their common work in training officers of the United States Army and Navy for the purposes of military government in the Far East, in the School for Overseas Administration, Harvard University. But it does not represent the "official" position; it is a col-

lectivity of individual responsible opinions. Nor is this book a "hasty pudding" in most ancient Harvard style, in which nine contributors merely supply unrelated material. On the contrary, an underlying order holds the separate parts together as can be seen immediately after reading the introductory chapter (agreed to by seven of the nine contributors, the others being absent from Cambridge, Mass.) on "Japanese Situations as Criteria of Practical Policy," in which, as it were, the "historical constants" in the situation confronting the occupying power are displayed as conditions to be noted, if not as boundaries for the long run, then at least as tentative limits in the immediate future. It embodies a sort of compressed sociology of Japan.

Then follow the various chapters according to a sort of pattern. To this reviewer it goes something like this. Mr. Edward Ackerman, a geographer at Harvard, opens with "Japan: Have or Have-not Nation?" He examines the question whether the Japanese could be confined to live entirely upon the resources within her home islands, and if so what changes and adaptations must ensue. If it can be shown that such a policy is possible on certain terms, a limiting case is established as possible in fact, and the urgings, both overt and covert, of the groups who want Japan shut in and deprived of all conquests and denied all contacts, would have a reasoned basis (notwithstanding the costs). His policy would be feasible if frightful. On the other hand, if it is desired to give Japan a measure of industry, or if it wished to screw reparations out of her, then a different policy becomes imperative, because of certain weaknesses in resources.

Mr. Ackerman shows that "sealing up" is possible. He says "with the manufacturing industry, the farming economy, the marine industry, and other extractive industries operating to the extent made possible by their environment alone, the many Mr. Suzukis of Japan would not fare so badly. In fact they might be somewhat better off than before the war . . . They would have fewer material or imperial reasons for patriotic inspiration; they would wear rayon instead of cotton; and a bicycle would be somewhat harder to get." Again "every bone, button, and scrap of sewage would have to be put to use," but, says Ackerman, "they would have enough to eat, and they would live in houses nearly identical with those of the present, including electricity." A certain major effect would follow—it would alter profoundly Japan's demographic policy. But "on the other hand, if the United Nations wish the Japanese to raise their standard of living above what it now is; if they wish to maintain Japanese manufacturers as an important part of the Far Eastern economy; if more selfishly, they wish reparations; or if they feel that Japanese have as much right to increase their numbers as anyone else—then they will have to permit Japan access to resources outside the islands."

These two limiting cases represent the polarities of policy—the hard-peace-no-military-potential-school will choose nearer the "sealed-in" type of policy; the altruistic will approximate the other policy.

But how did Japan get herself into this pass? Here G. Nye Steiger, historian, provides a rapid history in five broad stages beginning 25 B.C. and ending the first lap is 593 A.D. when "Imperial-Civilian Rule" opens the next phase with the appearance on the scene of the Soga family. An interesting feature here is the way in which Buddhism was encouraged from Korea to counter the local Shinto cult; and so on through the feudal period, the Tokugawa period and thence to modern Japan, to the day when she was in fact stripped of all her acquisitions, in the articles of surrender, and hence reduced to the guinea-pig status as envisaged by one limiting group in the previous chapter.

But the earlier mention of population policy brings Talcott Parsons, sociologist,

into a consideration of the Japanese social structure and the trends of population. This is a piece of competent sociology which is enhanced by Parsons' examination of three possible policies, given the structure of Japan's society and economy. The "stew-in-her-own-juice-policy" (i.e. sealing up) would strengthen conservative traditionalist forces. Urban industrial forces would decline in relative strength; the integration of the new isolated society would flow from the indigenous patterns not so long ago in absolute power. Tensions would become explosive and struggles for power ensue upon the withdrawal of the occupying forces. On the other hand a communist order would find conditions favourable —anti-capitalist agrarianism, a disciplined people, a "mass" of workers,—and authoritarianism would reappear in communist garb, plus militarism and a pro-Russian policy. The third possibility—the most difficult—is to bring Japan nearer the models of Western democracy. The short-run chances are dim, the long-run, difficult in the extreme. How for example to free the peasant and others from group pressures, and to transform responsibility for the group into responsible independent action? "Perhaps the most important condition of a democratic direction of development in Japan," says Parsons, "is sufficient stability so that the forces which can effect the desired change have opportunity to operate over a long enough period."

There follows thereafter the thorough examination of the Japanese Farm-Tenancy System by Seiei Wakukawa, an Okinawan specialist in Japanese affairs. The item of special interest here, quite apart from the comprehensive statistics, is the rise of the Nippon Nomin Kumiai (Japan Farmers' Union, 1922) with its incipient promise of becoming part of a wider farmer-labourer movement, against which was soon flung the technique of mass-arrests.

Mr. Ackerman returns with a consideration of industrial prospects, all of which turn on the policy of the victors. The outlook for small manufacturers is good; the rest depends on local resources plus allowed markets.

The pattern of the volume next introduces two parts by the editor on the non-material factors—religion, magic, morale, ideology.

What chance have the Japanese of breaking the "cake of custom"? What factors within the apparatus of their culture will resist the changes required for a liberal Japan? Haring's analysis reveals some of the antecedents of Japanese religion; he shows effectively the different development of certain ideas in China and Japan. The role of "compulsive routines" is stressed; likewise the concept of "Kami" stands out as the central theme of Japanese supernaturalism from earliest times to the present." This section on the various guises in which Kami can appear is excellent fare. He reaches the melancholy conclusion that "Japan's government was, and still is, government by symbolic ritual that scarcely differs from magic." The central theme is "government-worship-unity." But defeat has shown the victor's "Kami." "Can," he asks, "the Japanese people accept the idea that the Kami of Heaven and Earth no longer avail in a world of science that has discarded magic?"

The chapter on Military Government is especially interesting. The apparatus of the current control is described. It is exclusively a headquarters organization; it utilises the Japanese channel of command; it avoids direct contact with the Japanese people. The directives are addressed to the government not the populace. It is disclosed in this chapter that conceptions of military government and personnel trained in advance were swept away when the detailed mode of control as envisaged by Brigadier General Crist was displaced by the decision to exercise authority through the Emperor's Government. Verdict on General MacArthur's procedure and results is suspended. One interesting feature was the failure to plan or train personnel for the tasks of control in Korea.

There is a chapter on the Prospects of Constitutional Democracy by F. M. Watkins, Professor of Government. "To discount the prospects of constitutional democracy in Japan nevertheless would be extremely unwise." Then W. H. Chamberlain comes on the scene with the problem of Russian policies in the Far East as his assignment. There seems a suggestion in this chapter, as I read it, that Japan does not figure quite as high in Russian priorities as other desiderata. These latter, in Chamberlain's view appear to be security in lands adjacent to the Soviet Far East; co-equal influence with America in China, and the assertion of Russian interests in the borderlands of China. The final chapter by Professor Friedrich raises some of the wider issues involved in the settlement of questions arising out of the erstwhile Japanese Empire.

A useful part of the book then follows in the form of three appendices. Appendix A contains the Cairo Declaration; the Potsdam Declaration, the initial U.S. post-surrender policy for Japan, and the old constitution of Japan. Appendix B is a reprint of an article on Military Government for Japan by Freidrich and Haring from the "Far Eastern Survey," Vol. 14, No. 3, and Appendix C is a guide to reading on Japan. A useful index is provided.

The book as a whole serves as a background to the questions of policy. What can be done? What means are wisest for the Allied ends? Upon what sort of situation, material, cultural, spiritual, are new concepts to be tried out? The book omits in the main any discussion of key Japanese personalities now living. If the contents of these essays were even approximately the substance of the teachings given the officers in the School for Overseas Administration, then they were well served in advance. Perhaps more was necessary than is given on the subject of educational opportunities; also the relation of the present status of women, and their prospects of improvement, and the chances of creating a broader stream of tendencies favourable to a liberal regime, might have had a little more attention. But if it is possible to speak of Japan in one volume, this is it.

—H. D. Black.

Documentation.

The Asian Relations Conference Rapporteurs' Reports, I.

The following three reports cover (1) Cultural Problems (2) Racial Problems and Inter-Asian Migration (3) National Movements for Freedom.

1. Cultural Problems.

Chairman: Mr. Phya Anuman (Siam). (Alternate), Mr. Kupradze (Georgia).

Vice-Chairman: Sir R. P. Masani (India).

Rapporteurs: Miss L. Naidu, Mr. K. G. Saiyidain.

It was decided to take up as the first item, the question of scientific research and its development and coordination in different countries of Asia. In opening the discussion an Indian delegate pointed out how all Asian countries stood to gain from cooperation in the field of Science, that Science was essentially international and political prejudices should not be allowed to mix up with the appreciation of the scientific and cultural achievements of other peoples. While recognising the debt that Asia owed to Europe and America in the field of Science, he warned the countries of Asia against remaining tied to the apron strings of the West and against the growing tendency to send students to the West indiscriminately instead of developing their own scientific institutes and training their own teaching personnel. Asia possessed the necessary resources, material and psychological, for doing first rate work in Science. She must learn to respect herself, to eschew merely "Imitative Research" and, throwing off the cultural domination of the West, she should strive to make her characteristic contribution to the enrichment of world culture.

In the discussion that followed representatives from Burma, India, Ceylon, Palestine, Egypt, China, and Siam took part. A delegate from Burma raised the question of the lack of scientific equipment and apparatus in countries like Burma which have been ravaged by the war and which could not carry on scientific work on that account. It was pointed out in reply by an Indian delegate that a great deal of scientific work could be done with the help of amazingly simple apparatus prepared locally and by the students themselves, and that it was not necessary to rely exclusively on costly western equipment. A delegate from Afghanistan suggested that certain restrictions placed on the purchase of paper, stationery and scientific apparatus by the Government of India should be relaxed so far as their use in educational institutions was concerned.

An Indian delegate invited the attention of the Conference to the urgency of relating scientific research dynamically to the vital problems of food, health, sanitation, hygiene and education so as to raise the material and cultural level of the masses. While recognising the importance of developing first rate institutes of Science in Asia, he deprecated the idea of our dissociating ourselves in any way from work being done in western countries in this field, for knowledge and science are after all one and indivisible. It was, however, observed by another

Indian delegate that this view should not be interpreted to mean that Governments had the right to expect immediate practical or commercial results from scientific research. A number of the delegation from Palestine raised the issue that some suitable agency should be set up to facilitate the exchange of scientific knowledge through books, journals and periodicals and suggested that important scientific and technical articles should be translated in all Asiatic languages and published in different countries.

At the instance of the Vice-Chairman, the wider question of Asian collaboration in the different field of science and culture was then taken up and it was generally agreed that it was desirable to set up a central organisation, with a permanent secretariat, which would explore all practical possibilities of collaboration amongst scientific and cultural workers and institutions, and facilitate the exchange of students, teachers, scholars and books.

It was pointed out by an Indian delegate at this stage that the Steering Committee had set up a sub-committee to draw up a scheme for the establishment of an Asian Institute and that this scheme would be placed before the Steering Committee and the plenary session of the Conference in due course. It might, therefore, be advisable for this group to appoint a small sub-committee to work in collaboration with the other sub-committee. He also referred to the need for the setting up, if possible, of a School of Asian Studies but cautioned against depending too much on Governments which were often apt to work in set grooves and not too willing to receive new ideas. They might, of course, give financial help, but the initiative and general direction should remain in the hands of men of science and culture.

In the ensuing discussion speakers from Egypt, Palestine, China, Ceylon, Burma and India took part and expressed their views and reactions to this important proposal. Opinion was divided whether there should be one or several institutes and whether certain countries should or should not specialise in certain fields of work for which they had special facilities, students from all other countries being sent there for higher studies and research in these fields. Some members also expressed the view that the main function of these group conferences was to promote intellectual contacts and exchange of ideas and not to concentrate too much on the establishment of one or more institutes. The general consensus of opinion appeared to be that we should not attempt too much at this stage and that, if an effective central organisation could be set up as a result of this Conference, it would be its function to explore further possibilities of Inter-Asian co-operation in the fields of science and culture. Reference might be invited in this connection to certain papers submitted to the Conference on the creation of an Institute of Asian Culture and of an All-India Cultural Association for the purpose.

It was generally agreed that one of the first functions of this organisation should be to serve as a live centre of information and exchange of ideas so that good work being done in the various countries could be made known to all interested workers and their needs in the way of scholars, teachers, books and apparatus could be brought to the notice of relevant authorities and organisations. It should also endeavour to utilise fully existing institutions and academies like the Inter-University Board in India for this purpose and, where necessary, Regional University Boards might be set up which could help in making the services of experts available for inspection and advice.

Some members gave actual instances of how intellectual co-operation was already being attempted in different Asian countries on a small scale. In Egypt, in spite of the shortage of teachers for national needs, teachers were being sent

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out to Iraq, Palestine, Syria, Lebanon, Transjordania and Abyssinia, and during their period of deputation they were paid half of their salary by the Egyptian Government. The Calcutta University had recently taken steps to promote cultural co-operation between India and China by appointing a Chinese scholar on its staff, and the Government of China had granted scholarship to Indian students for working on Chinese culture and civilisation. It was further pointed out that there was an Academy of Science in China, a Royal Institute of Science in Siam, a Cultural Committee of the Arab League in Egypt and a Central Academy of Sciences was about to be established in India very shortly, and all these organisations were prepared to co-operate with similar central organisations in other countries with the object of pooling their resources for the common good.

On the 25th March, the discussion of other cultural problems was taken up and it was initiated by the Chairman (the delegate from Georgia) who read a paper describing the great cultural and scientific progress made in the Georgian Republic since the Revolution in 1917. During this period the earlier policy of colonial and imperialistic exploitation had been reversed and, like other Soviet Republics, this Republic had been able to introduce compulsion in elementary education and to establish a large number of schools, colleges and technical institutes. It was a pleasant surprise to learn that as much as about 70% of the national budget was being spent on educational and cultural activities.

Delegates from Ceylon, Kazakhstan, Egypt, Uzbekistan, Malaya and Cambodia then gave accounts of the educational and cultural progress made in their countries during recent years. These showed that, in spite of many handicaps, there was a great deal of educational consciousness in many Asiatic countries and, in some of them, marked educational progress had been made. There was a noticeable general tendency to bring education nearer to life, to provide better facilities for children in schools, to improve the training of teachers and to democratize schooling.

Against this bright side of the picture, members of the Indian delegation pointed out that educationally Asia, together with Africa, was on the whole the most backward part of the world where literacy was the lowest and the dissemination of culture to the masses had not been attempted in an organised and scientific manner, and that unless due attention was paid to fundamental education, including both child and adult education, no abiding superstructure of culture could be erected. It was generally agreed that attention to this basic problem was a matter of high priority and that, in addition to schools and other formal agencies of education, the modern media of mass communication like the radio, the cinema, the theatre and the press should be utilized for raising the level of knowledge and culture amongst the masses and the possibilities of Inter-Asian cooperation in this field should be fully explored. The following suggestions were made in this connection by delegates from India, Nepal, Ceylon, Burma, Palestine and Egypt:—

- (a) Collaboration amongst libraries and museums.
- (b) Translation of Classics and other significant works from one language to another.
- (c) Production of suitable documentary and educational films of common interest.
- (d) Appointment of teachers of various Asian languages by the countries concerned in other Asian countries.
- (e) Comparative study of Asiatic cultures at the Universities and at the proposed school of Asian studies.
- (f) Consideration of the equivalence and recognition of University degrees and Diplomas.

- (g) Compilation of pamphlets and memoranda about educational and cultural conditions in different countries.
- (h) Institution of scholarships and reduction of fees for foreign students.
- (i) Provision of hospitality to visiting children who come on excursions and free travel and accommodation for language students in the host country.
- (j) The holding of Inter-Asian students' conferences.
- (k) Setting up of an Inter-Asian Physical Culture and Education Association.
- (l) The setting up of an Asian broadcasting station.

It was decided to refer these various suggestions to the plenary session of the Conference and the proposed central organisation.

The question of values was then raised by the members of the Indian delegation who stressed the fact that Asia had always cherished certain values as possessing supreme importance and it was essential that these should be critically studied, adapted to modern needs and communicated through education to each succeeding generation, as they were otherwise in danger of being swamped by the aggressively material values of the modern West. It was pointed out that amongst the values held in special esteem in Asia are respect for human personality, recognition of the privacy of the spirit, the importance of religion in life, faith in the unity of mankind, the kinship of all religions and devotion to peace and creative work. To preserve these values and eradicate some of the suicidal conflicts of the modern age it was necessary to re-write history on rational and humane lines, to link politics with morality, to subordinate the idea of nationalism to the concept of human brotherhood and unity and to develop an active appreciation for the cultures, the religions and the attitudes of other peoples. All forms of narrowness, it was asserted, were the negation of the basic concept of Asiatic culture. It was also suggested that the Conference might well consider the formation of a declaration of its faith and fundamental values. Attention was invited in this connection to several monographs submitted to the Conference by delegates and others on education and culture in Asia.

An Indian delegate then opened the discussion of the problem of an international auxiliary language and gave account of the various attempts that had been made from time to time to evolve a common world language and how they had failed for one reason or another. He expressed the opinion that, as national jealousies would not allow the use of any of the existing languages, the only way out was to "construct" a language for the purpose and this should be done not by any individual, but by an international or Asian committee, possibly by a Committee appointed by this Conference. In the discussion that followed representatives of India, Malaya, Georgia and China took part, but the suggestion to appoint a committee for this purpose did not find general favour. It was agreed that while it may be possible to construct an artificial language with a simple grammar and vocabulary, it was unlikely to serve the purpose in view and was not in any case an immediate or urgent problem. The general opinion seemed to be that, for the present, we should continue to use English, which was more commonly understood than any single Asian language and which offered the further advantage of being a useful language of intercourse with the Western nations. There was no reason to allow considerations of continental prestige to preclude the use of an available and practical medium for this purpose. Meanwhile, it was also necessary that the study of Asian languages should be encouraged in all countries and an increasing number of scholars, specialists and men of Commerce

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and Politics should become conversant with the languages of their neighbouring countries.

2. "Racial Problems and Inter-Asian Migration."

Chairman: Dr. Won Yuan-Ning (China).

Vice-Chairman: Sardar K. M. Panikkar (India).

Rapporteurs: Dr. C. V. Furer Haimendorf and Mohd Salleh Daud.

After a short preliminary discussion on the definition of "race" and "racial discrimination," the Chairman outlined the main principles which should govern the relations of different racial groups in all Asiatic countries. These principles are:—

1. Complete legal equality of all citizens;
2. Complete religious freedom of all citizens;
3. No public social disqualification of any racial group;
4. Equality before the law of persons of foreign origin who have settled in the country.

Representatives of China, India, Ceylon, Indonesia, Burma and several other countries stated that the existing or proposed constitutions of their respective countries did not contain any provision for discrimination based on racial grounds. The consensus of opinion was that equality between all citizens of a country, irrespective of race and creed, should be the rule for all countries.

The next point for discussion was the legal status of immigrant populations, such as Indians in Burma and Ceylon, and Chinese in Malaya, Burma and Indonesia. All delegates agreed that a distinction must be made between these immigrants who identify themselves with their country of adoption and apply for naturalisation, and those who choose to remain nationals of their mother-country.

The Vice-Chairman expressed the opinion that every state must be its own judge over the composition of its nationhood, and must consequently be granted the right to restrict or control immigration. While this view was generally accepted, most delegates emphasised that laws relating to immigration should not have retrospective effect. But the leader of the Ceylon delegation drew attention to the fact that a distinction should be made between those with a permanent interest in the country of immigration, and those who constitute a floating labour population.

After a discussion on the technicalities of naturalisation it was generally felt that:—

- (a) All foreign settlers in Asian countries who are prepared to comply with the naturalisation laws and who look upon the country of their adoption as their homeland and sole object of their loyalty should be granted full citizenship.
- (b) Alien settlers who want to retain the nationality of their country of origin should have equality before the law—without having civic rights—should enjoy safety of person and property, and should be treated in a generous manner.

Several delegates raised the problem whether dual nationality should be permissible. It was pointed out, for instance, that Chinese cannot divest themselves of their nationality and that Chinese accepting the nationality of another country do not prejudice thereby their claim to Chinese nationality. The Chinese delegates explained that Chinese returning to China from abroad must register in their own country, in order to regain full citizen rights, and this may be taken

as proof that their Chinese nationality remains dormant while they are abroad and enjoy the privileges of the nationality of a different country. It was generally agreed that at any *one* time a person can have only *one* nationality, and that no person can claim citizenship of country and at the same time enjoy the protection of his home country. Indeed, an Indian delegate pointed out that such countries as India and China should not encourage emigrants to look for help to their home country, but that emigrants permanently settling in a foreign country should be advised to identify themselves with that country.

Whereas most delegates agreed that liberal naturalisation laws should regularise the status of existing foreign settlers, there was considerable divergence of opinion in regard to future immigration. Many delegates, though recognising the right of every country to control immigration, felt that complete prohibition of all immigration would lead to ill-feeling between the countries concerned, and therefore, advocated a quota system. It was emphasised, however, that such a quota system should not lead to the total exclusion of the nationals of any Asian country as such.

A Burmese delegate explained why some of the smaller countries of South-East Asia insisted on restricting immigration. He spoke of Burma's fear of being swamped by the people of the two powerful and populous neighbouring countries, India and China, and mentioned that at present Burma's foreign, i.e. non-Burmese population, was increasing much more rapidly than the indigenous population. A Malayan delegate supported this view by saying that in Malaya a similar process has led to a situation where the Malays form a minority—of about 40%—in their own homeland. A Ceylonese delegate pointed out that in Ceylon the Indian population amounted at present to about one-sixth of the total population, and that in the minds of the Ceylonese there was the fear of domination and even of ultimate submergence.

At the Chairman's request to face the realities of conflicts between indigenous and immigrant populations, the delegates proceeded to explore the causes for the hostility and suspicion prevailing in several Asian countries between the autochthonous inhabitants and recent immigrants. None of the delegates denied that such hostility did exist, and the Vice-Chairman summarised the general view by pointing out that in most cases economic factors were responsible for tension and distrust. People such as the Burmese and the Malays felt that Indians and Chinese exploited them, and used the resources of the country to build up wealth which was finally sent out to the settlers' homeland. The Indians and Chinese, on the other hand, fully conscious of this resentment, were doubtful of the security of their property in Burma or Malaya and for this very reason tried to transfer profits to India or China. Thus a vicious circle was created which can be broken only by a change of attitude among both parties. The fear of economic submergence on the part of the economically less advanced indigenous populations must be removed, and the newcomers must be assured of full rights of citizenship if they choose to identify themselves with the people of the country.

All delegates agreed that while legally there is little discrimination against individual racial or national groups, there is considerable *de facto* discrimination in the sphere of administration and public life. Various measures were suggested in order to overcome this discrimination and to remove mutual suspicion. There was general agreement that the long-term methods of education, social contacts and cultural exchange were indispensable for a lasting elimination of all racial inequalities, but various delegates expressed the belief that such immediate steps as the opening up of communal social institutions to other communities and the

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financing of social services or the establishment of hospitals and schools by wealthy immigrants would greatly contribute to the lessening of tension.

Towards the end of the session the problem of backward communities, such as the aboriginal tribes of India, Burma, Indonesia, was shortly discussed. The Vice-Chairman pointed out that the position of these backward tribal communities was similar in most countries of South and South-East Asia. They were distinct from the rest of the population not owing to any recent political development, not owing to administrative arrangements such as the "Excluded Areas" of India, but owing to their age-old cultural and racial isolation. Their assimilation to the standards of advanced populations was by no means easy and could not be left to chance. It was necessary to study their cultural, social and economic conditions before embarking on any policy aiming at their ultimate assimilation, and for such scientific anthropological study of tribal populations international cooperation was required. An Indian delegate from Bihar concurred with this view and emphasised that the aborigines must be helped to develop on the lines of their own culture so that in the future they could themselves choose between their tribal style of life and the civilisation of materially more advanced populations.

3. National Movements for Freedom.

Chairman: Mr. Phillip Hoalim (Malaya).

Vice-Chairman: Sir N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar (India).

Rapporteur: Mr. M. A. Raschid (Burma).

After some preliminary discussion, it was agreed that as freedom movements are essentially political, the subject should be discussed from all aspects, including the political, to which specific references could be made. For convenience of discussion, it was decided to consider problems relating to the various countries one after another. References to internal difference were, however, to be avoided. There was sufficient time for discussion of problems relating to Burma, Ceylon, Indonesia, Malaya and Viet Nam only. Towards the close of the sitting the Chairman enquired whether the Group desired to discuss the problems of any other Asian country, but no one raised any such problems for discussion. The discussion revealed a considerable degree of unanimity amongst delegates on the subject. It is not proposed to enter into historical surveys of freedom movements in the Asian countries in this Report, although references were frequently made by delegates to important developments in their respective countries.

Freedom movements in Asian countries have derived their inspiration from revolutionary developments both in neighbouring countries and other parts of the world. An Indonesian delegate mentioned that the movement in that country had been influenced by the revolutions in Russia, China and the victory of Japan over Russia early in this century. The outbreak of the second World War focussed greater attention on freedom movements in Asia. The cry of "Asia for the Asiatics" raised by Japan for its own motives, gave further incentive to freedom movements in some of the South-East Asian countries. There is an intensive and widespread urge in Asian countries to terminate foreign domination. It is realised that for various reasons Western colonial powers, Britain particularly, cannot afford much longer to hold Asian countries in political subjection. The question may, therefore, resolve itself to the speedy termination and peaceful transfer of political power. An Indian delegate suggested, with reference to Burma, that Burmans should develop the mental attitude that the British could not effectively continue to govern Burma for any length of time.

Delegates from Burma and Malaya pointed out that it was likely that an attempt may be made by Western powers in certain countries to continue economic domination. It was necessary to bear this aspect of the matter always in mind. Political freedom without economic freedom would be of little value. The smaller countries would need economic assistance and help from other Asian countries. It was hoped, however, that such assistance would not lead to the imposition of domination by any bigger Asian country on any smaller one. In this connection stress was laid by several delegates that there was need for the co-ordination of views formulated in this Group with the conclusions evolved by other Groups.

Considerable sympathy and admiration was expressed by delegates from various countries for the struggles for freedom now going on, particularly in Indonesia and Viet Nam. Several delegates pledged the moral support of their respective countries to freedom movements in other Asian countries. A delegate from Malaya suggested the formation of a Neutrality Bloc in Asia. It was urged by delegates from Burma, Indonesia and Malaya that no Asian country should give any direct or indirect assistance to any colonial power in its attempt to keep any Asian country in subjection. Reference was particularly made to the need for refusal by all Asian countries of facilities for transport, use of aerodromes, and supplies for armed forces to colonial powers for purposes of domination of other Asian countries.

A Chinese delegate stated that the fear of Chinese domination in certain countries was completely unjustified. In all her history, China had never followed a colonial policy. She would not stand in the way of achievement and maintenance of Freedom and self-determination by any Asian country.

With regard to the use of Indian troops in Burma and Indonesia, it was explained by Indian delegates that the Indian people have all along been opposed to the use of the Indian troops in other Asian countries. Till recently, India had no control over its army. It is the policy of the present interim government of India to withdraw Indian troops from other Asian countries. In any event, these troops would not be allowed to be used for the suppression of national movements for freedom in any Asian country. A delegate from Nepal stated, by way of reply to a Ceylon delegate, that he has not heard of any proposal that a garrison of Gurkha troops should be stationed in Ceylon. He promised to draw the attention of the Nepalese Government to the remarks made at the meeting. In regard to frequent references to the need for help by Asian countries in struggles for freedom in other Asian countries an Indian delegate pointed out that, short of a declaration of war, it was difficult to visualise what form such help could take, except moral support. He emphasised that it was necessary that any support should not have the effect of enlarging the area of conflict. This should, as far as possible, be avoided.

The Group was unanimously of the view that non-indigenous minorities resident in any Asian country should support and assist the struggle for that country's freedom. It was necessary to ensure complete unity between all peoples resident in a country. A Chinese delegate suggested that in order to retain the sympathy of other Asian countries, all Asian countries should treat the non-indigenous minorities fairly. A Georgian delegate pointed out that a country cannot be completely free if it does not have the goodwill and friendship of all national minorities. The Georgian constitution has provided for an independent development of culture for all peoples in the country.

A delegate from Burma requested for support in getting Burma and other

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Asian countries admitted as members of the UNO and other international organisations. Delegates from India and China promised full support in the matter. An Indonesian delegate suggested that all other Asian countries should immediately recognise the Indonesian Republic.

It was mentioned by a Ceylonese and a Malayan delegate that they felt that Britain was attempting to get stronger in these countries, possibly with a view to retaining her supremacy in the Indian Ocean. They pointed out that these countries might become "danger spots" and developments there need to be carefully watched.

Stress was laid on the need for greater exchange of information regarding national movements for freedom between Asian countries. The establishment of an Asian news agency for this purpose was suggested by an Indonesian delegate. There was general agreement that Asian countries should speedily move towards freedom based on democracy. It was necessary that the standard of living in all Asian countries should improve with the approach of freedom. In order that this may be done, Asian countries should assist one another by exchange of technical information and experts. A Ceylonese delegate urged that the march towards freedom should mean increasing prosperity for the common man.

[To follow:

Transition from Colonial to National Economy.

Agricultural Reconstruction and Industrial Development.

Labour Problems.]

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